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INTRODUCTION
In 1970, Congress adopted the Organized Crime Control Act, Title IX
of which created the "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations"
statute.2 RICO-as it has come to be known-was created as a weapon
against organized crime; along with defining new forms of criminal
liability, it created civil remedies for those who had been victimized by
organized crime? In the two decades since RICO was adopted, a
controversy has arisen concerning the extent to which vicarious liability
may be imposed for RICO violations in actions brought under the
statute's civil remedy provisions."
The controversy centers around whether it is legitimate to use civil
doctrines such as respondeat superior to hold a "person," typically a
corporate employer, liable for crimes committed by its employees or
agents The concern is that such an application departs from traditional
principles of criminal responsibility, which have not recognized the civil
doctrine of vicarious liability.6 This Article suggests an alternative means
of holding a party civilly liable for RICO violations committed by its
agents or employees.
Federal criminal law recognizes the Pinkerton doctrine, a common
law rule that makes each conspirator responsible for the substantive
offenses that are committed by other members of that conspiracy
Though seldom employed in civil RICO actions, the Pinkerton doctrine
provides an alternative means of imposing liability upon parties who,
while they may not have personally committed RICO violations, agreed
to their commission! The virtue of this alternative is that it allows
liability to be imposed in accordance with existing principles of federal
criminal liability, thereby eliminating the need to resort to civil doctrines
such as respondeat superior.
2 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1988)).
'See id. at 922-23 (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
'See, eg., Thomas E. Dwyer, Jr. & Stephen Kiely, Vicarious CivilLiability Under the Rackteer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 21 CAL. W. L. REv. 324 (1985); Senah Green, Note,
Judicial Efforts to Redirect an Errant Statute: Civil RICO and the Misapplication of Vicarious
Corporate Liability, 65 B.U. L. REv. 561 (1985); Michele Theroux, Note, Innocent Corporate
Employers-hould They Be Held Vicariously Liable Under Civil RICO?, 24 NEw ENG. L. REv. 677
(1989); infra notes 123-278.
See discussion infra notes 124-63.
'See discussion infra notes 55-70.
7 See bfra notes 94-104 and accompanying text. Offenses are divisible into those that require
cooperative effort for their completion and those that do not; conspiracy and complicity are examples
of the former, while arson, homicide, burglary and robbery are examples of the latter. See eg.,
BLACK's LAw DIcriONARY 1597 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
' For the few reported instances involving attempts to utilize Pinkerton in civil RICO actions,
see discussion infra notes 164-278.
[Vol. 81
CV RICO
Part I of this Article outlines the elements necessary to impose
liability under the RICO statute. Part II describes the standards used to
impute liability for another's acts in civil and in criminal law. Part III
describes the issues arising as a result of imposing vicarious liability in
civil RICO actions and explains how the Pinkerton doctrine can be used
to resolve a number of these issues.
I. RICO: AN OVERVIEW
RICO resulted from a national concern with organized crime that
arose in the 1950s and 1960s, fostered by a series of Congressional
hearings that brought the existence of a group known as "La Cosa
Nostra," or "the Mafia," to the attention of the American public.9 To that
end, RICO created "enhanced sanctions and new remedies" designed to
combat criminal organizations. In a departure from the normal
approach to criminal statutes, Congress provided that RICO be construed
liberally "to effectuate its remedial purposes."" This directive has been
applied to both its civil and criminal provisions.
Despite its origins, RICO has not been limited to use against those
who are demonstrably affiliated with "organized crime" in the conven-
tional sense. 3 Indeed, most civil and criminal RICO actions do not
See PREsIDNr's COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSrnCE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FRE SocirY 466 (1968); DONALD R. CRessy, THEFT OF THE NATION:
THE STRuCTURE AND OPERATmONS OF ORCANZED CRIM IN AMERICA 17-21, 43-44, 309-10 (1969);
ESrES KEFAUVER, CRIME N AMERICA 1-18 (1951); Craig Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the
Courts: An Analysis of.RICO, 65 IowA L. Rzv. 837, 837 (1980); John L. McClellan, The Organized
Crime Act or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME L. Ray. 55, 58-60
(1970). For a discussion of the other provisions of the Act, see Craig Bradley, Racketeering and the
Federalization of Crime, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REy. 213, 255-57 (1984).
00 Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act, 84 Stat. at 923 (1970); see
also G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations (RICO):
Basic Concepts-Criminal & Civil Remedies, 53 TEI. L.Q. 1009, 1013 (1980) (stating that RICO
authorizes enhanced criminal penalties and new civil sanctions to combat organized criminal
behavior).
" Organized Crime Control Act § 904(a), 84 Stat. at 947; see also United States v. Russello,
464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983) (noting that RICO is the "only substantive federal criminal statute that
contains such a directive").
,2 See e.g., United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978).13 See eg., Theroux, supra note 4, at 678-79 ("RICO has not been used against organized crime
defendants except in a small percentage of cases. As of 1985, only nine percent of the district court
civil RICO decisions involved 'allegations of criminal activity of a type generally associated with
professional criminals."') (footnotes omitted) (quoting Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481
(1985)); accord Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, supra note 9, at 257; see alio
Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 170
(1980) (noting that most RICO defendants "could not conceivably be included within the traditional
or newly expanded definitions of organized crime").But see Paul E. Coffey, The Selection, Analysis,
and Approval of Federal RICO Prosecutions, 65 NoTR DAME L. Ry. 1035, 1043 (1990) (RICO
1992-93]
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involve members of La Cosa Nostra but are brought against a variety
of "civilian" defendants. 4 Critics argue that such indiscriminate
application is a misuse of the statute, but RICO's defenders maintain
that its diversity of defendants merely implements the directive that
the statute be liberally construed. 5 Both agree that RICO's unique
structure allows it to be used in a wide range of contexts and against
a variety of defendants. 6 The following discussion first outlines
RICO's general structure as a criminal statute, and turns next to an
examination of its civil remedies.
RICO targets "enterprise criminality," which consists of committing
offenses "in the context of an organization." 7 RICO makes it a distinct
offense to use an organization, an "enterprise" in RICO parlance, as an
instrument for committing crimes defined by other statutes." The
"enterprise" can be anything from a Mafia crime family to a legitimate
corporation to a "Mom and Pop" shop, as long as it engages in or affects
interstate or foreign commerce. 9 To commit a substantive RICO
violation,20 a RICO "person," defined as an "individual or entity capable
of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property,"' must employ a
remains the single most effective device for prosecuting . . . organized criminal activity").
" See, ag., Sedima v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that RICO is
primarily used "for purposes totally unrelated to its expressed purpose"), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985);
see also Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REv. 805 (1990) (arguing
that RICO has strayed from its intended purpose and has become a dangerous tool); L. Gordon
Crovitz, How the RICO Monster Mauled Wall Street, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1050 (1990) (arguing
that Congress should restrict RICO to is original purposes); Thomas G. Reed, The L2efense Case for
RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691 (1990) (arguing that Courts should limit the extent of RICO's
reach); Barry Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 298-300 (1983) (stating that RICO has
been employed against those who do not appear to be the intended targets of the legislation).
" As to critiques, see sources cited supra notes 13-14. For a defense, see Coffey, supra note 13,
at 1049 (noting legislative mandate "that RICO be liberally construed"); Craig W. Palm, Note, RICO
and the Liberal Conswction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 167 (1980) (arguing that Congress
statutorily mandated liberal construction and broad application).
' See, eg., sources cited supra notes 13-15.
See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 10, at 1013-14; Thomas S. O'Neill,Note, Functions of the
RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 646, 649 n.12 (1989).
" 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). An enterprise "includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity." Id. The definition, however, is not intended to be exhaustive. See Blakey &
Gettings, supra note 10, at 1023 ("works by illustration, not by limitation").
" See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (stating that an enterprise must be engaged in or its activities must
affect interstate or foreign commerce); supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also O'Neill, supra
note 17, at 649 n.12 ("The term [enterprise] speaks of the commission of crime in the context of an
organization, which is as easily a corporation as a mafia family."); sources cited supra notes 13-14
(discussing RICO'sintended and actual defendants). In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583
(1981), the Supreme Court held that an enterprise can also consist of persons "associated in fact"for
purely illegal purposes.
"There are four RICO offenses-three substantive offenses and a RICO conspiracy. See bifra
notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1988). Again, the categories are illustrative, as the definition says that
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"pattern of racketeering activity" or engage in the "collection of unlawful
debt' in a manner having a specified impact on an enterprise
"Unlawful debt' results from illegal gambling or "loan-sharking.
23
The "collection of unlawful debt' alternative is rarely used in RICO
litigation.24 Most cases, civil and criminal, allege that one or more
defendants used a "pattern of racketeering activity" to commit RICO
offenses 5 The statute defines a "pattern of racketeering activity" as the
commission of "at least two acts of racketeering activity" within a ten-
year period." The Supreme Court has held that acts of racketeering
activity must be linked by "continuity plus relationship" to form a RICO
pattern.
27
RICO defines "racketeering activity" by incorporating conduct that is
prohibited by state law and other federal statutes. ' These offenses are
known as "predicate offenses," ostensibly because RICO violations are
predicated on their commission, and include "any act or threat
involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion,
dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous
person "includes" these entities. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 10, at 1022-23.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-c) (1988). See also infra text accompanying notes 32-34 (discussing
substantive violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c)). The "person" and "enterprise" can be the same;
it is generally accepted that they must be distinct under subsection (c) but not under subsection (a)
or (b). For cases involving subsection (c), see Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747
F.2d 384, 400 (7th Cir. 1984) (separate entities required), affid on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606
(1985). But see United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 987-90 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that a
corporation may be both the defendant and the enterprise under subsection (c)), cert denied, 459 U.S.
1170 (1983). For cases under subsections (a) and (b), see Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News,
884 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1989); Petro-Tech Inc. v. The Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987);
Medallion TV Enterprises, Inc. v. SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1290 (C.D. Cal. 1986), afid,
833 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 3241 (1989). However, the enterprise and the
persons under RICO are usually alleged as distinct entities. See O'Neill, supra note 17, at 664-69.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1988).
See, e.g., Tarlow, supra note 14, at 370-71.
"See id.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). The ten-year period excludes "any period of imprisonment." Id.
In addition, at least one of the alleged acts must have occurred after the effective date of the statute,
which was October 15, 1970. See Organized Crime Control Act, 84 Stat. at 922 (1970).
"Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985). In H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone, 492 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1989), the Court explained that a "relationship" exists if the
racketeering acts "have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission" or are otherwise interrelated and not isolated. "Continuity" denotes either "a closed
period of repeated conduct" or conduct that poses a danger of repetition. Id. at 241 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3575(e)).
- 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). Since RICO was enacted, Congress has increased the number of
crimes that constitute "racketeering activity." See, eg., Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7054, 7032, 7020(c), 102 StaL 4181 (1988); Motor Vehicle Theft Law
Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-547, § 205, 98 Stat. 2754 (1984).
" See generally Coffey, supra note 13, at 1036 (discussing the nature of the predicate offense
under RICO).
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drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year."'  The federal predicates comprise a
"laundry list" of offenses, including bribery, counterfeiting, embezzling
pension and welfare funds, mail and wire fraud, obscenity, obstructing
justice, interfering with commerce, money laundering, labor crimes,
bankruptcy fraud, securities fraud, drug offenses and violating the
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act"
To commit a substantive RICO violation, a "person?' must engage in
a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of unlawful debt so as
to: (1) acquire or maintain an interest in, or control of, an enterprise; (2)
establish or operate an enterprise; or (3) conduct or participate in
conducting an enterprise's affairs?2 Typically, in a RICO case, the
defendants are charged with engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity
by committing at least two predicate offenses within ten years of each
other so as to affect an enterprise in one of the ways listed above.' The
most frequently used provision is 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which makes it an
offense to use a pattern of racketeering to "conduct or participate, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of" the enterprise's affairs. 4
18 U.S.C. § 1961(IXA) (1988). The state offenses are only "definitional," encompassing
"generic" categories of prohibited conduct. See ag., H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 25
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4032; 1 KATHLEEN BtuCKEY, CORPORATE CRMINIAL
LtAainrY § 7:13 (1984). Since the statute requires only that conduct be "chargeable" under state law,
it encompasses such associated offenses as conspiracy to commit the offenses listed above. See, eg.,
United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040, 1045-47 (6th Cir.) (holding that conspiracy to commit
murder may be a predicate act under § 1961(1XA)), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B)-(E) (1988).
3z See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1988). Under subsection (a), the offense is to "use or invest,
directly or indirectly," income derived from racketeering or collection of unlawful debt to acquire
an interest in, or establish or operate the enterprise. Under subsection (b), the offense constitutes
using the pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of unlawful debt "to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly" an interest in or control of an enterprise. Under subsection (c), the offense
consists of using the pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of unlawful debt to "conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of" the enterprise's affairs.
" See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Substantive offenses based on the "collection of
unlawful debt" have the following analogous structure: the predicate offense is collecting debt
resulting from illegal gambling or"loan-sharking," see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1988); the RICO offense
is using these acts to engage in an activity prohibited by the statute, see supra note 32 and
accompanying text.
' See, ag., Pamela H. Bucy & Steven T. Marshall, An Overview of RICO, 51 ALA. LAw. 283,
285 (1990) ('[Section] 1962(c) offenses are the most common. One study of all reported RICO cases
through 1985 showed that 92 percent ... charged a violation of 1962(c), or a conspiracy to violate
1962(c)."); accord Gerald Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I and 11, 87 COLUM.
L. REv. 661, 724, 726, 731 (1987); Mark S. Poker, Reaching a Deep Pocket Under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 72 MARQ. L. Rev. 511, 515 (1989); Tarlow, supra note
14, at 324; Paul W. Flowers, Comment, H.J., Inc.: Targeting Federal RICO's Pattern Requirement
to Long-Tern Organized Criminal Activity, 51 Omo ST. LJ. 713, 714 (1990); Green, supra note 4,
at 567. Section 1962(c) is also the provision most commonly used in civil litigation. See, e-g., John
P. Bany, When Protestors Become "Racketeers, " RICO Rums Afoul of the First Amendment, 64 ST.
JoHN's L REv. 899, 902 n.17 (1990) ("Section 1962(c) is the provision most commonly used in civil
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RICO conspiracy is also used quite often: 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) makes
it a crime to conspire to commit a substantive RICO offenses, i.e., to
violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (b), or (c).' It is settled that a subsection
(d) offense lies in the agreement to commit a substantive RICO offense,
rather than the agreement to commit the predicate act necessary for such
an offense.' While some courts hold that the offense of conspiracy is
complete with the agreement, others require an overt act in furtherance
of the agreement.' In addition, the federal circuits are divided concern-
ing whether the offense is agreeing that some member(s) of the conspira-
cy will commit substantive violations,ss or whether a conspirator must
personally agree to commit such violations.39
Courts do agree that RICO conspiracy does not merge into substan-
tive offenses, meaning that criminal defendants can be convicted of, and
punished for, both. ° For each violation, such defendants can be fined
"not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both" and must forfeit any property, or any interest in property, that they
"acquired or maintained" by committing RICO violations!'
Civil RICO actions incorporate this general structure, the primary
difference being the remedy sought.42 The statute provides that
RICO suits."); Califa, supra note 14, at 815 ('The vast majority of both civil and criminal RICO
cases involve (c) and (d)."). Like the other substantive offenses, subsection (c) can be violated either
by using a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of unlawful debt to this end. See supra
note 32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 32.
"See, ag., Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Sauthmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 792 n.8 (3d
Cir. 1984) ("mere agreement to commit the predicate acts is not sufficient ... under § 1962(d)").
" Compare United States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496, 499-501 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that no
overt act is required) and United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir.) (finding no overt act
requirement), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986) with United States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253, 1256
(5th Cir. 1983) (holding that an overt act is required). See also 1 BRIcKEY, supra note 30, § 7:15
(discussing the split of authority concerning an overt act requirement under § 1962(d)).
"See Pryba v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 305, 306 (1990) (White, 1., dissenting), denying cert
to 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir. 1990); see also I BiucKEY, supra note 30, § 7:15 (discussing the division
in the circuits over personal commitment to the offense); James C. Mannis, Comment, Clarifying
PJCO's Conspiracy Provision: Personal Commitment Not Required, 62 TuLANE L. Rv. 1399, 1400
(1988) (same).
" See United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.), cerL denied sub nom. Rabito v.
United States, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1342 n.64 (5th Cir.
1983), cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (Ist Cir.
1981), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); see also 1 BRicKEY, supra note 30, § 7:15 (discussing
the split in the federal circuits).
' See 1 BRicKEY, supra note 30, § 7:15; see also United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 572 (9th
Cir. 1979) (imposing consecutive sentences for convictions under subsections (c) & (d)), cer. denied,
445 U.S. 946 (1980). At common law, conspiracy merged into a completed substantive offense, so
that a defendant could not be sentenced for both. Se, ag., ROLLiN M. PERKMs & RONALD N.
BoycE, CuMNAL LAW 687-88 (3d ed. 1982).
1 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
41 Se, eg., Thomas Fitzpatrick & Brian O'Neill, Elements of a ,RICO Action, in CVL Rico
1989, at 7, 12 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series 14o. 153, 1989) ("The elements
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"[a]ny person injured in his business or property by" a RICO offense
"may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."' Even though this
provision was included when RICO was adopted in 1970, very few
civil RICO cases surfaced until the 1980s." Since then, there has
been an "explosion of civil RICO litigation.' '4
Much of this increase is attributable to the availability of treble
damages for successful plaintiffs; litigants have become increasingly
aware of this aspect of the statute.' Also, RICO pleading seems simple
and straightforward: a plaintiff who claims to have been injured by a
substantive RICO violation must merely allege that her business or
property was injured by the defendants' using a pattern of racketeering
activity or the collection of unlawful debt to affect an enterprise in one
of the statutorily forbidden ways 7 A plaintiff may also base a claim on
RICO's conspiracy offense if she can show that her business or her
property was injured by defendants who conspired to commit one or more
substantive RICO violations." Though the Supreme Court has not yet
of a criminal RICO action and a civil one are the same except that in the latter the plaintiff must also
prove a compensable injury.").
4' 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
U See, eg., In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1424 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (noting that this civil
remedy has been ignored for almost a decade); Green, supra note 4, at 561 ("Private plaintiffs
brought few RICO actions prior to 1980.").
Sedina v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 486 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985); see aso
Theroux, supra note 4, at 681 (declaring that the "volume of RICO cases has increased exponentially
in recent years"); sources cited supra note 13 (noting the proliferation of RICO actions in the past
decade).
" As one illustration, see Marconi v. White Sox, Ltd., No. 83-C-7015 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1986)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) (plaintiff brought RICO action against baseball team because
security guards confiscated baseball tickets that plaintiff was scalping).
,' See, eg., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499. A civil RICO plaintiff must establish four elements: "(1)
a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt; (2) the existence of an
enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce; (3) a nexus between the pattern of
racketeering activity and the enterprise; and (4) an injury to its business or property by reason of the
above." Fitzpatrick & O'Neill, supra note 42, at 19-20.
' Se4e, g., Zervas v. Faulkner, 861 F.2d 823, 832-35 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting a failure to show
injury); Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 728 F. Supp. 1123, 1135 (D.NJ. 1989) (necessity of
showing injury resulting from conspiracy); Howe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 686 F. Supp. 461, 465-66
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (discussing a failure to show injury); Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639, 642-44
(E.D. Ky. 1988) (holding that a plaintiff who has proven a subsection (d) conspiracy to violate either
subsection (a) or (c) has standing to recover under subsection (c) if he can show injury from any
overt acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy). Professor Brickey explains the difficulty that the
federal circuits have had regarding the plaintiff's burden of establishing a subsection (d) injury as
follows:
[here remains the problem of identifying the ensuing injury. Conspiracy is, after all, an
inchoate offense. As such, it does not cause harm. The Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits have thus concluded that the plaintiff who sues under 1962(d) may allege that the
injury resulted from either an overt act or a predicate crime committed in furtherance of
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determined what standard of proof governs civil RICO cases,"" most
federal courts require only a preponderance standard.'
Obviously, plaintiffs who are attracted to civil RICO by the possibili-
ty of recovering treble damages will make every effort to name "deep-
pocket' defendants who can satisfy such an award in the event that the
plaintiffs prevail. Often, these wealthy defendants will be individuals or
entities who were not directly involved in committing the acts at issue in
a RICO suit. This creates an incentive for the plaintiff to employ
vicarious liability doctrines in an attempt to hold such parties liable for
the actions of others. The next section describes the doctrines that have
been used to impute liability in civil and criminal law.
II. VicAwous LIABILrrY, COMPLICITY AND RICO
Vicarious liability is the practice of holding a person, or more
recently, an entity, liable for another's actions." In civil law, this is a
common practice, known either as vicarious liability or as "respondeat
superior."' It arises from policy concerns53 that, at least until recently,
the conspiracy. The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, has ruled that the injury must be
caused by a substantive RICO injury.
BRuCK.m, supra note 30, at § 14.10 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at §§ 14:12-13 (discussing the
quality of the injury requirement before and after Sedima).
" See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491 ("we need not decide the standard of proof issue today").
50 See e.g., Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 531 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
preponderance of evidence is sufficient and discussing cases to that effect); accord Liquid Air Corp.
v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 917 (1988).
" S e.g., GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw 266 n.1 (2d ed. 1961) (describing vicarious
liability as "responsibility for the act ... of another"); Green, supra note 4, at 599 ("Vicarious
liability, often called the doctrine of respondeat superior, is the imposition of actor A's liability on
innocent party B, due to the existence of some relationship between A and B"); accord
REsrATEMEwr (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 870, 876, 877 (1970); RESrATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY
§ 219 (1958); see also RESrATEmExr (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 212 (1958) ("A person is subject to
liability for the consequences of another's conduct which results from his directions as he would be
for his own personal conduct if, with knowledge of the conditions, he intends the conduct, or if he
intends its consequences, unless the one directing or the one acting has a privilege or immunity not
available to the other."); id. § 216 ("A master or other principal may be liable to another whose
interests have been invaded by the tortious conduct of a servant or other agent, although the principal
does not personally violate a duty to such other or authorize the conduct of the agent causing the
invasion.").
" See e.g., Denise Cote, Viarlu Liability under Civil RICO, in CIVIL RICO 1990, § H(A)
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. C4-4193, 1990).
" One commentator has justified vicarious liability as follows:
The traditional justification ... is that one who is in a position of control over a situation
must exercise that control or bear the loss. More recently, .. . courts and commentators
have recognized that this rationale provides little explanation for holding an employer
liable when he has done his best to control his employees. Modem justifications
characterize vicarious liability as "a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of risk." The
employer is forced to internalize the liabilities created by his employees as a cost of doing
business. Because he sought to profit by an enterprise which may predictably harm others,
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have not been regarded as applicable to criminal liability.' For that
reason, criminal law has hesitated to adopt respondeat superior, although
it does impute liability for another's conduct under certain circumstances,
as explained below.
A. Respondeat Superior
"'Qui facit per alium facit per se. "55
Agency law holds an employer, or "principal," liable for the acts of
her employee, or "agent," if certain requirements are met.' Under the
common law doctrine of respondeat superior, which is the governing rule
in federal law, an employer is liable for the acts of her employee that are
within the employee's scope of employment.' An employer is not liable
for acts outside the scope of employment unless (1) she meant for them
to occur; (2) she was negligent or reckless in supervising her employees;
(3) the conduct "violated a non-delegable duty" imposed on her; or (4)
the employee "purported to act or to speak' on her behalf and "there was
he should bear the cost. The modem economic rationale for vicarious liability stresses that
the employer is in a better position to absorb the cost of these liabilities, or to insure
against them, and to shift these costs to the public.
Green, supra note 4, at 499 (footnotes omitted) (quoting W. PAGE KEEroN Er AL., PROssEm AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499-500 (5th ed. 1984)).
' See, eg., PEIUNs & BoycE, supra note 40, at 911-14 ("courts have refused to convict oftrue
crime on the basis of respondeat superior"); WLLLAmS, supra note 51, at 266-69 (finding no
vicarious criminal liability at common law); Frances B. Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts
of Another, 43 HARv. L. REv. 689, 723 (1930) (declaring that criminal law "has never accepted the
doctrine of respondeat superior"). For a fither discussion of the hesitancy of criminal law to adopt
the doctrine of vicarious liability, see infra note 108.
-" "He who acts through another acts for himself." BLACK's LAw DIC'IONARY 1413 (Rev. 4th
ed. 1968).
" A master, or principal, is one "who employs an agent to perform service.in his affairs and who
controls or has the right to control the physical conduct of the other in the performance of the
service." RESrATFMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(1) (1958). An agent is "employed by a master to
perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled
or is subject to the right to control by the master."Id. § 2(2). A principal can also be liable for acts
of agents who are not employees. See, eg., id. § 212 ("A person is subject to liability for the
consequences of another's conduct which results from his directions as he would be for his own
personal conduct if, with knowledge of the conditions, he intends the conduct, or if he intends its
consequences.").
" See Sarah N. Welling, Intracorporate Plurality in Criminal Conspiracy Law, 33 HASTS
L.J. 1155, 1166 n.106 (1982) (rule in federal law); accord New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R.
v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1909); United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1155,
1158 (5th Cir. 1977); see also RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) ("A master is
subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment."); supra note 51 and accompanying text (providing the general nature of vicarious
liability). The rule encompasses acts of agents other than employees. See supra note 56.
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reliance upon apparent authority, or [s]he was aided in accomplishing the
tort by the existence of the agency relation. '
Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, an employee acts within
the scope of his employment if his conduct is "of the kind he is
employed to perform;" is "substantially within the authorized time and
space limits;" and is at least partially "actuated ... by a purpose to
serve" his employer. 9 Conduct is outside the scope of employment if
it is "different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized
time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the mas-
ter." ' An employer can, however, be civilly liable for conduct that was
outside the scope of employment if the employee utilized his "apparent
authority" as an agent of the employer to commit the injury.6 '
SRSATEEr (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958).
Id. § 228(lXa)-(c). R.SATE MENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 229 fRther defines the contours
of "within the scope of the employment" as follows:
(1) To be within the scope of the employment, conduct must be of the same general
nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized.
(2) In determining whether or not the conduct, although not authorized, is nevertheless so
similar to or incidental to the conduct authorized as tobe within the scope ofemployment,
the following matters of fact are to be considered-
(a) whether or not the act is one commonly done by such servants;
(b) the time, place and purpose of the act;
(c) the previous relations between the master and the servant;
(d) the extent to which the business of the master is apportioned between different
servants;
(e) whether or not the act is outside the enterprise of the master or, if within the
enterprise, has not been entrusted to any servant;
(f) whether or not the master has reason to expect that such an act will be done;
(g) the similarity in quality of the act done to the act authorized;
(h) whether or not the instrumentality by which the harm is done has been furnished
by the master to the servant;
(i) the extent of departure from the normal method of accomplishing an authorized
result; and
(j) whether or not the act is seriously criminal.
"Id. § 228(2).
"See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 228 cmt. a (employer is "liable if a servant speaks
or acts, purporting to do so on behalf of his principal, and there is reliance upon his apparent
authority or he is aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation"); see also
id. §§ 8, 27 (providing the rules for determining when apparent authority exists and its scope). One
commentator has explained the scope of an employer's liability for the action of his employees' as
follows:
mhe employer may still be liable ... if the plaintiff relied upon the agent/employee's
apparent authority to engage in such conduct, or if the employee was somehow aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relationship. ... [Aipparent
authority ... stems firom the innocent third party's understanding of the agent/employee's
authority, not the ... actual scope of authority. Accordingly, some fraudulent acts, while
not within the scope of one's employment, can be within the scope of one's apparent
authority with respect to an innocent third party. Consequently, the employer ... may
remain liable, even if the employee's tortious conduct was committed solely to advance
the employee's personal illicit motive, where the plaintiff relied on the employee's
apparent authorization to so act.
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Criminal conduct is not necessarily outside the scope of employ-
ment. 2 According to the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
[t]he fact that the servant intends a crime, especially if the crime is of
some magnitude, is considered in determining whether or not the act is
within the employment, since the master is not responsible for acts
which are clearly inappropriate to or unforeseeable in the accomplish-
ment of the authorized result. The master can reasonably anticipate that
servants may commit minor crimes in the prosecution of the business,
but serious crimes are not only unexpectable but ... are in nature
different from what servants in a lawful occupation are expected to
do.
63
Under the Restatement, an employer "may be subject' to criniinal liability
for acts committed by an employee or other agent, even if such acts were
not authorized by the employer." Such liability usually exists for
offenses that require "neither intent to violate the law nor knowledge of
facts which constitute a violation." 5 Liability is not imposed, however,
when an offense requires a specific criminal intent, unless authorized by
statute."
In addition to these provisions, the Model Penal Code creates a
doctrine of "criminal respondeat superior," which makes corporate
entities liable for the acts of their employees or agents; this is the
Theroux, supra note 4, at 687-88. For an extended discussion of the issues arising when respondeat
superior doctrines are applied to RICO actions, see infra notes 131-53 and accompanying text. But
see infra note 69 and accompanying text (noting that criminal vicarious liability is much narrower
in scope than civil vicarious liability).
" RIEsATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENcY § 231 (1958) ("An act may be within the scope of
employment although consciously criminal.").
"Id. § 231 cmt. a.
"Id. § 217D.
"Id. § 217D cmt. b.
Many regulatory statutes do not require intent to violate then, or even knowledge of the
act or condition which causes the conduct to be illegal. In such cases, a master or other
principal may be held subject to a penalty for conduct of servants or other agents acting
on his behalf... or in conducting transactions of the kind for which they are employed.
Id.
" Apart from statute, an employer is not subject to a penalty for an unauthorized act
constituting a crime committed by an ordinary servant in the scope of employment if the
basis for liability is a specific criminal intent However, ... an employer may be
penalized for the act of an advisory or managerial person acting in the scope of
employment Ordinarily, he is not subject to liability for the acts of such persons if they
act disobediently and not for the purpose of serving the employer. Even in such cases,
however, a statute may provide for the liability of the employer.
Id. § 217D cmt. d. A "specific intent"is "son intent other than to do the actus reus"required of an
offense. PERKiNs & BOYCE, supra note 40, at 851. In other words, it is a specific intent "in addition
to the intentional doing of the actus reus itself."Id at 852. For example, when one takes another's
property, one must intend to steal it in order to satisfy the elements of larceny. Id.
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standard in many states.' Under this doctrine, a corporation is liable for
an offense if any of three conditions is met: (1) the offense was
committed "by an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of the
corporation, within the scope of his office or employment"; (2) the
offense "consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty" imposed by
law; or (3) commission of the offense "was authorized, requested,
commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors
or a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the
scope of his office or employment.V'  The first requirement has been
interpreted to permit corporate liability for employee actions that were
intended to benefit the corporation, although no actual benefit resulted."s
Thus, an employer is not liable when an employee commits criminal acts
solely for his own benefit."
B. Complicity
At common law, it was possible to hold one person liable for
another's criminal acts, though the premise for doing so differed from the
premise supporting agency law. The common law of crimes also had a
category of "principals," but the correlative category was "accessories,"
rather than "agents."'
See Welling, supra note 57, at 33 n.106; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1) (1985)
(noting that this provision is an exception to the general requirements of a personal act); cf. §
2.01(1) (A "person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes
a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.").
U MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1). The first requirement can be altered by statute. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.07(lXa). For the liability of unincorporated associations, see MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.07(3).
" See eg., WAYNE LFAVE & AusTm ScoTr, JX, CRMNAL LAw § 3.10, at 262 (2d ed. 1986).
Imposing liability on the corporation in this situation has been justified as follows:
[Ciriinal respondeat superior is much narrower than civil respondeat superior. An
employer/principal may be held criminally liable for the acts of its employees/agents only
where they acted (1) within the scope of their employment or agency and (2) with the
intent to benefit the corporation. This requirement of an "intent to benefit the employer"
is consistent with general criminal liability rules, which exempt victims from criminal
aiding and abetting liability even though their conduct may have met the substantive
requirements.
Cote, supra note 52, § II.B. See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128-29 (5th
Cir. 1962) (finding that intention to benefit the employer is not needed for civil liability); accord
American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 567-68 (1982); Gleason
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 278 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1929).
'" See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 69, § 3.10, at 262 ("It is not necessary that the criminal acts
actually benefit the corporation, but an agent's acts are not in behalf of the corporation if undertaken
solely to advance the agent's own interests or interests other than the corporate employer.") (footnotes
oritted).
"See, e g., PERKINS & BoYcE, supra note 40, at 722; 1 FRANcs WHARTON, A TREATLSE ON
CRmuNAL LAw 309-61 (1lth ed. 1912). The categories described above applied only to felonies;
misdemeanors were governed by a system that was similar but differed in certain respects. See
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Early common law further divided these categories, so that "princi-
pal" could be either a "principal in the first degree" or a "principal in the
second degree." A "first degree" principal perpetrated a crime; a
"second degree" principal was present when it was committed and "aided,
counseled, commanded or encouraged" the perpetrator.' "Accessories"
were involved in crimes, but their level of participation was less than that
of principals.74 Common law split these actors into accessories "before"
aj-d "after the fact."'75 An accessory "before the fact" was not present
when a crime was committed but had "procured, counseled, commanded,
or abetted the principal" who committed it.76 The accessory was liable
for the "probable consequences" of his "counsel or command to do an
unlawful act," but was not liable if the act committed was "essentially
different" from what he counseled or commanded.' An accessory "after
the fact" aided a "known felon" attempting to avoid liability for his
crime; common law regarded the assistance as participation in the original
offense."
Although common law distinguished these degrees of participation,
identical liability was imposed on principals in the "first degree" and
"second degree," as well as on their accessories.79 Important procedural-
ly, these categories were irrelevant to liability.s
LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 69, § 6.6, at 569; PEKiNs & Boyc, supra note 40, at 722;
WHARTON, supra, at 333.
' See e-g., LAFAVE & ScOrr, supra note 69, § 6.6, at 569-71; WHARTON, supra note 71, at
311-58.
' See. eg., LAFAVE & ScoTt, supra note 69, § 6.6, at 569-71 (discussing principals in the first
and second degree); PERKINS & Boyca, supra note 40, at 738 ("[A] principal in the second degree
is one who did not commit the crime ... but was present and abetting the principal."); WHARTON,
supra note 71, at 311 ("A principal in the first degree ... is the actual perpetrator of the criminal
act."). "Presence" meant actual, physical presence; it could also mean that one was "cooperating with
the perpetrator" and could assist him in committing the offense. See I JOEL P. BisHop, NEw
Comrma mrA~uEs ON THE CaMn A LAw 399-400 (8th ed. 1892); 4 WILLLAM BLAcKsroNF,
CoMMErrAiues *35; PERuiNs & BoycE, supra note 40, at 741; WHARTON, supra note 71, at 322-23.
See e.g., BisHop, supra note 73, at 405 (noting that an accessory "participates in a felony too
remotely to be deemed a principal"); BLAcKmron, supra note 73, at *35 (defining an accessory as
one who is "not the chief actor in the offence, nor present at its performance, but [who] is some way
concerned therein, either before or after the fact committed").
PERKNS & Boyce supra note 40, at 722; see also id. at 727 (discussing common law theory
of proper parties to a suit).
I WILLIAM L. CLARK, HAND-BOOK oF CREMINAL LAw 109 (2d ed. 1902); see also WHARTON,
supra note 71, at 336 (exploring the nature of an accessory "before the fact"); BIsop, supra note
73, at 410 (defining accessory "before the fact").
7, CLARK, supra note 76, at 110; accord WHARTON, supra note 71, at 343.
7 BLACKSrONE, supra note 73, at *37; LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 69, § 6.9, at 596;
WILLIAMS, supra note 51, at 409-10.
7' BLACKSrON, supra note 73, at *39; CLARK, supra note 76, at 115; PERKINS & BoYC, supra
note 40, at 729.
" See BLACKSrONE, supra note 73, at *39; PERKINS & Boyce, supra note 40, at 730, 735; see
also BISHop, supra note 73, at 396 (noting that the distinction between the two degrees is "without
practical effect"); PelucIms & Boyce, supra note 40, at 738 (finding that the "guilt is exactly the
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The Model Penal Code replaced the common law categories with the
doctrine of "complicity."' Section 2.06 of the Code provides that a
person is guilty of a crime "if it is committed by his own conduct or by the
conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable:" One is
legally accountable for another's conduct if she causes an innocent party to
engage in that conduct, if she is legally responsible for the other's conduct, or
if the two are "accomplices.:sa The second alternative imposes "vicarious
liability," while the third replaces "accessory" with a new term, "accom-
plice:?s 4
To be an accomplice, a person or entity must do one of the following
with the purpose of facilitating or promoting the commission of a crime:
(a) solicit another to commit it; (b) aid, agree to aid or attempt to aid
another in planning or committing it; or (c) have a legal duty to prevent
its commission but fail to do so.' 5 One is also an accomplice if a statute
defines his conduct as such or if he participates in causing a result that
is an element of the offense.s The victim of an offense is not an
accomplice; nor is one whose conduct was "inevitably incident to" its
commission.'
Like the common law, the Model Penal Code implements egalitarian
notions of culpability, holding all those who participate in an offense
equally liable.s The Code, however, differs from the common law in its
determination of the scope of liability of the participants in an offense.
Rejecting the common law rule that participants are liable for the "natural
and probable consequences" of their acts,s the Code instead imposes
liability only for those consequences that "might reasonably be expected
same").
" The Code was devised to provide a model for states to follow in revising codes based on
common law principles. See IAFAVE & ScoTw, supra note 69, § 1.1, at 2-6.
U MODE. PENAL CODE § 2.06(1) (1985).
13 Id. § 2.06(2); see id. § 2.06 commentary at 300. Under the first alternative, one must act with
the culpability that suffces for commission of the offense. Id. § 2.02(2Xa). Under the second
alternative, the law defining the offense or the Code must impose accountability for the conduct of
the party committing the offense. Id. § 2.02(2Xb).
Id. § 2.06 commentary at 305. This portion of § 2.06 permits the imposition of liability for
aiding acts that "may or may not be made criminal themselves, such as aiding suicide or suicide
attempts and the escape of prisoners or mental patients." Id. at 304. See also supra notes 67-70 and
accompanying text (discussing the Model Penal Code's doctrine of criminal respondeat superior). As
to "accomplice," the term was chosen to avoid the connotations of "accessory." See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.06 commentary at 305.
"MoDEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3).
"Id. §§ 2.06(3)(b), 2.06(4).
"Id. § 2.06(6). See id. § 2.06 commentary at 323-24 (acknowledging a victim exception); id.
at 324 (determining whether "unmarried party to a bigamous marriage [is] an accomplice of the
bigamist").
"See PE~mnqs & BOyCE, supra note 40, at 767.
"See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 commentary at 299.
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to result from the intended wrong. '' "e Under the Code, a perpetrator is
not liable "for conduct that does not fall within [his] criminal pur-
pose."
91
The federal law definition of complicity' incorporates the general
principles of common law liability; while rejecting the distinction
between accessories and principals, it does not adopt the Model Penal
Code approach. 3 The principles of federal complicity law are discussed
in somewhat more detail in part II.D. of this Article.
C. The Pinkerton Doctrine
Walter and Daniel Pinkerton were accused of evading liquor taxes.'
Charged with substantive crimes and conspiracy, both were convicted of
conspiracy; Walter was convicted of nine substantive offenses and Daniel
of six.95 The case went to the Supreme Court because the trial court had
instructed the jury that it could convict the brothers of all substantive
offenses that were committed to advance the conspiracy between them.'
The Court upheld the instruction and the convictions. Writing for the
Court, Justice Douglas found that the brothers were linked in a conspiracy
90 PERKwIS & BoycE, supra note 40, at 745 (citing BiAcKron, supra note 73, at *37). See
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 commentary at 311 (At common law, one who persuaded another
to commit a crime was liable even though the instigated party committed a different crime if the
crime committed was "likely to be caused by"the persuasion.).
"MODEL PENAL. CODE § 2.06 commentary at 311.
9 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). One is liable as a principal if he (1) "aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces or procures" the commission of an offense, or (2) "willfully causes an act to be done which
if directly performed by him ... would be an offense."Id.
3 See, eg., United States v. Kegler, 724 F.2d 190, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (abolishing the
distinction between principal and accessory); Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827, 831 (6th Cir.
1942) (adopting common law terminology); accord Colosacco v. United States, 196 F.2d 165, 167
(10th Cir. 1952); Tarkington v. United States, 194 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1952); Von Patzoll v. United
States, 163 F.2d 216, 218 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947); Rooney v. United States,
203 F. 928, 932-33 (9th Cir. 1913). One difference between § 2 and the Code is that, while aiders
and abettors are punished as principals under the former, they are less severely punished under the
Code. See MODEL PINAL CODE § 242.4. Federal law imposes liability for attempting to aid and abet
an offense. See, ag., United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1066 (5th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Lane, 759 F.2d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Martin, 1990 WL 7428, at *I (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 30, 1990). For the Code's treatment of liability for aiding and abetting, see MODEL PENAL CODE
§§ 2.06(3Xa)(ii), 5.01(3) & 5.01(3) commentary at 297-98, 356. Imposing liability for attemAed
aiding and abetting or for aiding and abetting an attempt is a departure from traditional common law
principles. See ag., United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408, 412 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that one
"charged with aiding and abetting the commission of crime by another cannot be convicted in the
absence of proof that the crime was actually committed"); accord United States v. Jones, 425 F.2d
1048, 1056 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 823 (1970); see also hrfr note 122 and accompanying
text (discussing fRther liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2 and other federal conspiracy statutes).
"Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 641 n.1 (1946).
"Id. at 641.
Id. at 642, 645 n.6. This was important to Daniel because Walter committed the substantive
offenses while Daniel was in prison. See id. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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when the offenses were committed. Likening a conspiracy to a "partnership
in crime," 7 Justice Douglas enunciated what has come to be known as the
Pinkerton doctrine: because members of a conspiracy are "partners in crime,"
they are liable for acts taken by their co-conspirators in furtherance of their
joint criminal purposes?8 Therefore, Daniel was liable for crimes that Walter
committed while Daniel was in jail?'
Justice Douglas based this doctrine on two sources-a rule of proximate
causation and a rule of complicity among co-conspirators.'se In dissent,
Justice Rutledge contended that the majority use of the rule of complicity
among co-conspirators abrogated the historic principle that in criminal law
guilt is "personal, not vicarious. '  But even before Pinkerton, participation
in a conspiracy could establish liability for crimes committed by other
conspirators; 2 this was simply a means of proving complicity, and Justice
Douglas derived his Pinkerton holding from this rule of complicity among co-
conspirators.'0 3 The major difference between the two doctrines is that
under Pinkerton, membership in a conspiracy gives rise to a presumption of
aiding crimes committed to further the goals of that conspiracy, while under
the older rule membership was evidence of complicity but did not give rise
to a presumption.'"
It is important to understand that Pinkerton is not actually a rule of
vicarious liability. As previously explained, in civil law vicarious liability
" Id. at 642, 644, 646 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 253
(1940)).
" Id. at 646-47. The Pinkerton doctrine does not apply if a "substantive offense ... was not in
fact done in furtherance of the conspiracy, did not fall within the scope of the unlawful prject, or
was merely a part of the ramifications of the plan which could not be reasonably foreseen as a
necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement." Id. at 647-48.
" Id. at 651 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part) (noting that Daniel was convicted "on proof that
he did no more than conspire ... to commit offenses of the same general character").
See Susan W. Brenner, Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton Liability
to RICO Actions, 56 Mo. L. REv. 931, 937-42 (1991).
"' 328 U.S. at 651 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part).
The Court's theory seems to be that Daniel and Walter became general partners in
crime ... and ... Daniel became ... responsible as a principal for everything Walter
did.... mhe result is a vicarious criminal responsibility as broad as, or broader than, the
vicarious civil liability of a partner for acts done by a copartner in the course of the firm's
business.
Such analogies from private commercial law and the law of torts are dangerous ...
for transfer to the criminal field. ... Guilt there... remains personal, not vicarious ....
Id.
102 Robinson v. United States, 94 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1938); People v. Creeks, 149 P. 821 (Cal.
1915); People v. McKane, 38 N.E. 950, 952 (N.Y. 1894); Whited v. Commonwealth, 6 S.E.2d 647
(Va. 1940).
2 See Brenner, supra note 100, at 937-78.
"e, e-g., Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 625 (1949) (Frankfurter, 1.,
dissenting); see also Brenner, supra note 100, at 949-78 (discussing in detail the differences between
Pinkerton and complicity).
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doctrines hold a person or entity liable for another person's actions.'
These doctrines reflect a policy of allocating the risks involved in
activities to those who are regarded to be in the best position to guard
against the activities."se Because this type of liability is based on social
utility, it is considered acceptable to hold a party liable even though that
party did not commit the act that actually inflicted the injury for which
redress is sought."7 Criminal law, on the other hand, traditionally made
personal fault a condition of liability."s
Because the opinion includes agency terminology,"° Pinkerton has
been construed as imposing vicarious liability."' But rather than
abrogating the personal act requirement, Pinkerton holds one liable for
the act of aligning herself with others for criminal purposes; having done
so, each nonacting member of the conspiracy is liable for crimes
committed by other conspirators because her acts of alliance "caused"
those crimes to be committed."' This act is sufficient to satisfy the
traditional causation requirements of criminal liability."' Indeed, this
act is certainly more blameworthy than the acts that suffice for imposing
civil vicarious liability."3 The only element of criminal liability that is
attenuated under Pinkerton is causation, which is construed just as it is
under general complicity doctrines."" Neither the Pinkerton doctrine
nor complicity requires that one's wrongful act actually cause the
commission of the crime for which she is held liable." 5 Instead, they
' See supra notes 55-70.
1W' See supra note 53; see also Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 155 A.2d 825 (1959) (explaining
that enactment of regulations enforceable by light penalties is a method of applying respondeat
superior in criminal cases); RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958) (stating that
the concept of vicarious liability stems from the idea that during the time of service, the master can
exercise control over the physical activities of the servant).
10Se eg., LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 69, § 3.9(d), at 255-56; KEaTON Er A., supra note
53, § 69, at 499-501.
... See Sayre, supra note 54, at 694-96. Aside from tradition, criminal law hesitated to impose
vicarious liability because, while a civil judgment normally requires payment of damages, a criminal
conviction can bring far more severe penalties, including imprisonment and death. See JEROME HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLEs OF CRIMINAL LAw 255 (2d ed. 1960); Sayre, supra, at 695.
See, ag., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646 (1946).
1P, See e.g., United States v. Troop, 890 F.2d 1393, 1399 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[C]oaspirators are
agents of each other and just as a principal is bound by the acts of his agents within the scope of the
agency, so is a conspirator bound by the acts of his co-conspirators.").
. See Brenner, supra note 100, at 944-78. This reflects the common law rule that parties are
liable for the natural and probable consequences of acts committed to aid another in carrying out a
given crime. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See Brenner, supra note 100, at 963-78.
" See eg., supra notes 55-70.
"' See Brenner, supra note 100, at 963-78.
Se4e, eg., United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). Indeed, because the act
at issue is wrongful in and of itself, liability attaches even though the target crime was never
committed. See e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 commentary at 388.
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rely on the concept of "mediate causation.""" "Mediate causation"
refers to situations in which one's acts are deemed to have exerted a
causal effect on another's conduct."7 Application of this conception
of causation avoids the difficult task of specifying the actual effect
such acts had on another's conduct by making it possible to assume
a causal effect sufficient to support liability."' The result is the
imposition of criminal liability that comports with traditional
requirements by including the element of demonstrable personal
fault." 9
D. Note on Complicity in Federal Law
The civil doctrines described above impose vicarious liability by
eliminating the requirement of a personal "bad act." 2' The criminal
doctrines discussed above impute liability for crimes others actually
perpetrate by holding one liable for the "bad act" of either assisting
in the commission of a crime or entering into a conspiracy of which
the criminal consequences were a foreseeable result.' Federal
criminal law, therefore, recognizes three types of imputed liability: (1)
aiding and abetting a substantive crime; (2) aiding and abetting an
attempt to commit a substantive crime; and (3) Pinkerton liability."
"' See Brenner, supra note 100, at 944-78.
"7 See id.
"' See id.
.. See generally LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 69, § 1.2(a)-(d) (discussing the general
characteristics of substantive criminal law).
' See supm notes 55-93.
,' See supra notes 71-119.
' Federal law also recognizes a variety of conspiracy offenses. See, ag., 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1988) (general conspiracy provision); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988) (RICO conspiracy). Conspiracy
is a separate offense from the substantive crimes that are its goal. Sep- eg., United States v. Bayer,
331 U.S. 532, 542 (1947); Pinkeron, 328 U.S. at 643. For aiding and abetting attempts, see United
States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982) (attempt to manufacture phencyclidine); United
States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.) (attempted tax evasion), cert denied, 353
U.S. 984 (1957); United States v. Anthony, 145 F. Supp. 323 (D. Pa. 1956) (attempted armed
robbery). One can be convicted of both conspiracy to aid and abet a substantive offense and aiding
and abetting the commission of that offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See, ag., United States v.
Huber, 772 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Kensil, 195 F. Supp. 115 (ERD. Pa. 1961).
Finally, federal law also makes it an offense to conspire to aid and abet a substantive crime, See,
ag., United States v. Frink, 912 F.2d 1413, 1416 (1lth Cir. 1990) (conspiracy to aid and abet
possession of a controlled substance); United States v. Nealy, Nos. 86-7263, 86-7264, 87-6611, 87-
8015, 840 F.2d 11, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 1849 (4th Cir. Feb. 17, 1988) (unpublished disposition
in federal reporter and full text available on LEXIS) (conspiracy to aid and assist in preparation and
presentation of false tax returns); United States v. Marino, 617 F.2d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1980)
(conspiracy to aid and abet bail jumping).
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From the plaintiffs perspective, it is often vital to obtain liability of
a deep pocket corporate employer in order to realize the promise of
RICO's treble damage provisions."
This section examines the issues that have arisen with regard to
applying civil vicarious liability doctrines in civil RICO suits and
explains how the Pinkerton doctrine can be used to resolve at least
some of these concerns. Part A defines the scope of this controversy,
and Part B explores the application of Pinkerton liability.
A. The Issue
Liability can be imposed on a civil RICO defendant in either of
two ways: an individual or entity can be either directly liable as a
perpetrator of the RICO offense(s) or vicariously liable for the acts of
its co-conspirators.'" If a plaintiff can prove that one or more
defendants with resources sufficient to satisfy an award of damages
under the statute actually committed the RICO violation(s), she will
not need to rely on vicarious liability; this is true even when a
defendant is an artificial entity that can only act through individual
agents.'" It is when the actual perpetrators have limited resources
that plaintiffs attempt to use vicarious liability to impute the actual
perpetrator's unlawful conduct to a party of sufficient means to satisfy
such an award." 6
W Cote, supra note 52, § L
12 See, eg., id. § I.A.; see also Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 29-32 (1st
Cir. 1986) (holding that under subsection (c) a corporate defendant cannot be both the RICO person
and the enterprise).
125 e4 eg., Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local 639, 839 F.2d 782, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
("organizations which conduct their own affairs by illegal means" are subject to direct liability);
Schofield, 793 F.2d at 30-32 (observing that where RICO permits liability against a culpable entity,
courts should find that such liability exists); Georgia Gulf Corp. v. Ward, 701 F. Supp. 1556, 1560
(N.D. Ga. 1987) (holding that plaintiff stated a RICO claim; though corporation "can only act through
its agents," it is directly liable when "its agent acts pursuant to express authority").
Wl See eg., Cote, supra note 52, § III.A. One commentator has explained the issue as follows:
The question is an important one for businesspersons and for their lawyer Imposing
vicarious liability upon the business entity is often the only way to find a deep enough
pocket to make the lawsuit worthwhile, even under RICO. In addition, the use of
vicarious liability in conjunction with civil RICO exposes corporations and other
businesses to treble damage liability for the acts of even low-level employee. Thus, the
real question is whether and under what circumstances a civil plaintiff, in true derivative
fashion, can reach the corporate purse under RICO.
Laura Ginger, Using RICO to Reach Into the Corporate Pocket: Vicarious Civil Liability of the
Business Entity Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 93 DICK. L. REV.
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Vicarious liability has been imposed in an analogous context: in
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel
Corp.,"7 the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of apparent
authority could be used to impose liability on a defendant in an action
seeking treble damages under federal antitrust statutes.IU The Court
found that such liability was "consistent with the intent behind the
antitrust laws" and was permissible even though the treble damages
were designed to serve both punitive and deterrent functions.29
Notwithstanding Hydrolevel, however, lower federal courts are divided
on whether vicarious liability doctrines apply in actions seeking treble
damages under RICO.'
465, 465 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
22 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
12 Id. at 577 ("holding ASME liable ... for the antitrust violations of its agents committed with
apparent authority").
12, Id. at 569, 574-76. The Court further explained:
mhe antitrust private action was created primarily as a remedy for the victims of antitrust
violations. ... Since treble damages serve as a means of deterring antitrust violations and
of compensating victims. it is in accord with both the purposes of the antitrust laws and
principles of agency law to hold ASME liable for the acts of agents committed with
apparent authority.
Id. at 575-76 (citations omitted); see also RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C cmt. c (1958)
(explaining that the general rule limiting punitive damages against master for the acts of her agent
does not apply when interpreting statutes awarding treble damages).
' Se4 eg., D & S Auto Parts, Inc. v. Schwartz, 838 F.2d 964, 968 (7th Cir.) (finding that
vicarious liability doctrines do not apply because RICO reveals "[c]ongressional intent to create an
exception to the general rule of respondeat superior"), cer. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988); accord
Yellow Bus Lines v. Drivers Local 639, 839 F.2d 782, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1988), vacated sub nor.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Yellow Bus Lines, 492 U.S. 914 (1989), adopted on reh'g, 913
F.2d 948, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991); Luthi v. Tonka
Corp., 815 F.2d 1229, 1230 (8th Cir. 1987); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 33
(1st Cir. 1986); Lappin v. Mesirow Inv., No. 91-C4374, 1992 WL 106776, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 11,
1992); Prochaska & Assoc. v. Merrill Lynch, No. 8:CV910073, 1992 WL 143662, at *4 (D. Neb.
Feb. 26, 1992); Jeffreys v. Exten, 784 F. Supp. 146, 156 n.8 (D. Del. 1992); Metro Furniture Rental,
Inc. v. Alessi, 770 F. Supp. 198, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Kahn v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 760 F.
Supp. 369, 372-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); First Nat'l Bank v. Lustiq, 727 F. Supp. 276, 280 (E.D. La.
1989); In re Citisource, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1069, 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Banque Worms v. Luis A.
Duque Pena E Hijos, Ltcd., 652 F. Supp. 770, 773-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Continental Data Sys. v.
Exxon Corp., 638 F. Supp. 432, 440 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp.
1188, 1194-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 759-60 (N.D. Cal. 1983);
Pames v. Heinold Commodities, 548 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (N.D. I1. 1982). But see Amendolare v.
Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 162, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that vicarious
liability does apply in RICO actions); accord Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North America,
824 F.2d 1349, 1358-59 (3d Cir. 1987); Connors v. Lexington Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 434, 437
(E.D.N.Y. 1987); Federal Say. &Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shearson-American Express, 658 F. Supp. 1331,
1342 (D.P.R. 1987); Tryco Trucking Co. v. Belk Stores Seres., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1327, 1334-35
(W.D.N.C. 1986); Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097, 1103 (D. Mass. 1986); Morley v. Cohen,
610 F. Supp. 798, 811 (D. Md. 1985); Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (D. Del.
1984). The Seventh Circuit has taken the middle road by recognizing the limited applicability of
vicarious liability in RICO actions. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1306 (7th Cir.
1987).
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Decisions that apply respondeat superior to civil RICO actions
generally do so on the theory that this furthers policies analogous to
those at issue in Hydrolevel: RICO provides redress for victims of
racketeering while imposing a sanction that punishes past instances of
such activity and deters the commission of future RICO offenses."'
These opinions tend to stress the remedial aspects of civil RICO
actions, while those that decline to apply respondeat superior often
emphasize the punitive nature of civil RICO actions.'3 Courts that
refuse to apply Hydrolevel-type reasoning to civil RICO actions often
cite the "significant differences between the antitrust statutes and
RICO.' 3 3 Many of these decisions find that respondeat superior
applies when "the structure of the statute does not otherwise forbid
it."
34
According to this theory, respondeat superior is permissible when
actions are based on violations of either subsection (a) or (b) of
section 1962, but not when based on violations of subsection (c)."
This view regards subsection (c) as applying only when "an 'innocent'
or 'passive' corporation is victimized by the RICO 'persons,' and
either drained of its own money or used as a passive tool to extract
1 See, eg., Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shearson-American Express, 658 F. Supp. 1331,
1342 (D.P.R. 1987).
The remedial purposes of §§ 1964 and 1962(c) are consistent ... with application of
respondeat superior. . . . As stated in ASME v. Hydrolevel ... if the principal is liable, it
is much more likely that similar violations will not occur in the future since pressure will
be brought on the organization to see to it that its agents abide by the law.
Id.; see also Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1083-84 (D. Del. 1984) (stating that
application of respondeat superior in RICO actions furthers the statutory goals).
'- See Federal Sa. &Loan Ins. Corp., 658 F. Supp. at 1342. See generally Shearson-American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240.41 (1987) (finding RICO damage awards are primarily
remedial in nature). But see Abel v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1141 (5th Cir. 1988)
(declaring that RICO damages in excess of actual damages are punitive); Tellis v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 805 F.2d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding RICO damages "penal in nature"),
vacated in part, 483 U.S. 1015 (1987).
'-3 Salvador v. Mazzoone, 686 F. Supp. 528, 532 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("Such differences include the
specific relationship and separateness between a 'person' and 'enterprise' required by § 1962(c) and
Congress's [sic] goals in adopting RICO as contrasted with Congress' goals in adopting the antitrust
statutes.").
"u Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349, 1358 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Schofield v.
First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding respondeat superior applicable
unless legislative history explicity indicates that Congress intended otherwise).
" See, ag., Schofield, 793 F.2d at 32. In fact, the First Circuit has declared:
[V]icarious liability is directly at odds with the Congressional intent behind section
1962(c). Both the language of that subsection and the articulated primary motivation
behind RICO show that Congress intended to separate the enterprise from the criminal
"person" or "persons". Indeed, there is unlikely to be a situation ... in which Congress
more clearly indicates that respondeat superior is contrary to its intent.
Id.; accord Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1306-07 (7th Cir. 1987); Pero-Tech, 824
F.2d at 1358-61.
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money from third parties."''" Such a restrictive view derives from
the generally accepted view that under subsection (c), RICO "persons"
must be distinct from the "enterprise," but that this distinction is not
necessary under subsections (a) or (b). This notion is drawn from the
language of subsection (c), which requires that the "person"' be
"employed by or associated with" the enterprise.'37 Although issues
involving RICO conspiracies arise far less often, courts generally hold
that claims under section 1962(d) are controlled by the rule governing
the substantive offense that was the object of the alleged RICO
conspiracy."
I" Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1359; accord B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633-
34 (3d Cir. 1984); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat' Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 399-402 (7th Cir.
1984), af'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
'""The person-enterprise rule has been justified as necessary to give meaning to the § 1962(c)
language that the person be 'employed by or associated with' the enterprise. It is simply non-
sensical to say that an entity can be 'employed by or associated with' itself." Cote, supra note 52,
§ M.B.
As to subsections (a) and (b), see Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 840-42 (4th
Cir. 1990) (en bane); Yellow Bus Lines v. Drivers Local 639, 839 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
vacated sub non. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Yellow Bus Lines, 492 U.S. 914 (1989),
adopted on rehg, 913 F.2d 948 (1990) (en banc), cert deied, I11 S. Ct. 2839 (1991); Liquid Air
Corp., 834 F.2d at 1307; Garbade v. Great Divide Mining Corp., 831 F.2d 212, 213 (10th Cir.
1987); Bishop v. Corbett Marine Ways, 802 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1986); Schofield, 793 F.2d at 32;
Masi v. Ford City Bank & Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1985); B.F. Hirsch v. Enright
Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d. Cir. 1984); Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th
Cir. 1984); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 n.8 (8th Cir. 1982), arf'dinpart & rev'din part,
710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cerlt denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. v. General
Electric Co., 712 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Filloramo v. Johnston, Lemon & Co., 697 F.
Supp. 517, 523 (D.D.C. 1988). But see Rose v. Bartle 871 F.2d 331, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding
that an entity could be both a person and an enterprise under subsection (c)); United States v.
Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988-90 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining why under subsection (c) a corporation
can be both a defendant and the enterprise), cert. denie, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983). The Seventh
Circuit, however, has implicitly adopted the "person-enterprise" rule by declaring:
Unlike subsection (c), which requires a relationshp between the "person" and the
"enterprise" ..., subsections (a) and (b) require only the use of an "enterprise" by a
"person." Accordingly, we hold that, like subsection (a), subsection (b) does not require
the existence of an enterprise separate and distinct fiom the person sought to be held
liable.
Liquid Air Corp., 834 F.2d at 1307; accord Landry v. Air Line Pilots Assn., 901 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.
1990).
" The only reported decision to consider this issue is United Energy Owners Comm., Inc. v.
United States Energy Management Systems, Inc., 837 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1988), which addressed
it only in dicta.
Since section 1962(d) makes unlawful conspiracies which violate sections 1962(a), (b)
or (c), Shreiber's rule applies to the plaintiffs' claims under section 1962(d) which allege
conspiracies to violate section 1962(a), though not to those which allege a violation of
section 1962(c). Therefore, under their section 1962(a) and (d) claims, plaintiffs have
alleged enterprises that, even if they are the same as the persons involved as defendants,
qualify as enterprises under Schreiber.
Id. at 364. In Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir.
1986), the court held that where a corporation engages in and benefits from racketeering, the
corporation can be both a person and an enterprise under subsection (a). But see Rae, 725 F.2d at
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The reason for the restriction imposed on actions asserting
subsection (c) violations lies in the nature of the statute's respective
prohibitions: subsection (c) makes it a crime to conduct, or participate
in conducting, the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity.'39 To reiterate, subsection (a) prohibits using
racketeering income to acquire an interest in, establish or operate an
enterprise, while subsection (b) forbids using racketeering activity to
acquire or maintain an interest in the enterprise."' The premise of
the restriction noted above is that an enterprise is victimized by a
subsection (c) violation and therefore should not be liable for its con-
sequences, even though the offense was carried out and/or facilitated
by the enterprise's agents or employees."1 Because an enterprise can
play an active role under either subsection (a) or (b), this limitation
does not apply and vicarious liability can be imposed if its essential
requirements are met." Likewise, at least one court has held that
vicarious liability can be used under subsection (d)."3
Aside from the "person-enterprise" distinction, courts impose
liability only if the elements of criminal respondeat superior are
satisfied, which usually turns on whether the employee-agents acted
481 (holding that there must be a distinction between the enterprise and the RICO defendant under
subsection (c)).
... See supra notes 9-50. Each provision also encompasses using the collection of unlawful debt
to accomplish the respectively prohibited ends.
Se &e supra notes 9-50.
1,2 See e.g., B.F. Hirsch, 751 F.2d at 633-34. The court in B.F. Hirsch declared:-
One of the Congressional purposes in enacting RICO was to prevent the takeover of
legitimate businesses by criminals. ... It is in keeping with that Congressional scheme
to orient section 1962(c) toward punishing the infiltrating criminals rather than the
legitimate corporation which might be an innocent victim of the racketeering activity ....
Id.; accord D & S Auto Parts, Inc. v. Schwartz, 838 F.2d 964, 967 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1061 (1988); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349, 1359 (3d Cir. 1987); Luthi v. Tonka
Corp., 815 F.2d 1229, 1230 (8th Cir. 1987); Schofield, 793 F.2d at 31-33; Haroco Inc. v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 402 (7th Cir. 1984).
2' See, eg., Haroco, 747 F.2d at 402 (holding that under subsection (a), "the liable person may
be a corporation using the proceeds of a pattern of racketeering activity in its operations"); see also
Liquid Air, 834 F.2d at 1307 (holding that vicarious liability is appropriate under subsections (a) and
(b)); Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 529 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing plaintiffs to amend
their complaint so as to claim that the parent corporation was vicariously liable for subsection (a) and
(b) violations of its subsidiary). Some courts apply respondeat superior under subsection (c) when
the corporation was not victimized by the racketeering activity. See, eg., Busby v. Crown Supply,
Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 839 n.5 (4th Cir. 1990); Mylan Lab. v. Akzo, 770 F. Supp. 1053, 1070 (D. Md.
1991); Gruber v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 679 F. Supp. 165, 181 (D. Conn. 1987); Morley v.
Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 811 (D. Md. 1985).
"43 See Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1084 (D. Del. 1984) (finding that "principles
of agency ... appear to support a claim under 1962(d)").
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within the scope of their employment.1" This requirement imports
an element of foreseeability into the analysis: a principal cannot be
held liable for unlawful conduct of which it was ignorant and which
was not a foreseeable result of its relationship with its agents.145 As
previously explained, conduct is within the scope of employment if
it was at least intended to confer a benefit on the principal;1" no
actual benefit need be shown, but many RICO decisions regard such
a benefit as a factor that strongly militates in favor of imposing
vicarious liability.47 The significance of this element of criminal
", For a discussion of criminal respondeat superior, see supra notes 67-69 and accompanying
text. Specifically, this is the first alternative under the Model Penal Code formulation of criminal
respondeat superior. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(lXa) (1985). Ginger, supra note 126, at 468, found
that agents "can bind the corporate entity by their wrongful conduct only when they act within the
scope of their employrent." See, e.g., Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 735 F.2d
1384, 1406-07 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (The "general rule" is that "if the employee committing the crime
is acting solely for his own benefit, his employer is not liable."'); Lappin Mesiro, No. 91C-4374,
1992 WL 106776, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 1992) (finding that employers are "vicariously liable
only for actions an employee takes within the scope of his or her employment, that is, with the
intent to benefit the employer"); see also Liquid Air, 834 F.2d at 1306 (finding that implied lia-
bility is only appropriate if the corporation can be said to be responsible for the acts of its
employees); Petra-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1361 (finding that there can be respondeat superior under
subsection (a) when the enterprise benefits from the racketeering activity); Schofield, 793 F.2d at
32-33 (noting that the adoption of a modified respondeat superior approach must insure that
Congressional intent is respected and legitimate businesses be spared); Haroco, 747 F.2d at 402
(finding liability appropriate "under RICO when the corporation is actually the direct or indirect
beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity, but not when it is merely the victirn"); Banque
Worms v. Luis A. Duque Pena E Hijos, Ltda., 652 F. Supp. 770, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that
vicarious liability is appropriate only when an employee acts within the scope of his employment);
Morley v. Cohen, 612 F. Supp. 798, 811 (D. Md. 1985) (finding the doctrine of respondeat superior
applicable to RICO when a corporation's agents act within the scope of their employment). Yet,
some courts require that the principal have knowledge of the benefit. See eg., Thrailkill v.
Champion Ford, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1486, 1489 (D.N.M. 1991); Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 695 F. Supp. 959, 962 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also D & S Auto Pas, 838 F.2d at 967 ("An
employee violating RICO without his employer's knowledge is highly unlikely to be acting for his
employer's benefit.").
',* See REsrATEmENr (SECOND) OF AGEN Cy § 231 cmt. a. See, e.g., SK Hand Tool Corp. v.
Dresser Indus., 852 F.2d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Dresser cannot be held vicariously liable under
RICO for the independent acts of its employees."). As an example, in Harrison v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1425, 1430 (N.D. I11. 1989), the court found that the acts of employees
of a brokerage firm were within the scope of their employment because they were "of the kind they
were hired to perform,"even though the conduct at issue was expressly prohibited by the employer.
"' See, eg., D & S Auto Parts, Inc, 838 F.2d at 966-67 (holding corporation not liable for
conduct of employee who stole auto parts, sold them for his benefit and billed plaintiff to conceal
the loss); supra note 69 and accompanying text.
"' See Liquid Air, 834 F.2d at 1306 (approving imposition of vicarious liability "provided the
corporation derived some benefit from the RICO violation"); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824
F.2d 1349, 1361 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding vicarious liability acceptable "so long as the enterprise does
in fact benefit from the racketeering"); Haroco Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Tnrst Co., 747 F.2d
384, 402 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding corporation vicariously liable "when the corporation is actually the
direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity"); Kahn v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
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respondeat superior is that it provides a means of distinguishing
"victim" principals from those whose involvement makes it reasonable
to cast them as perpetrators." This recognizes the basic principle
that, under criminal complicity, neither the victims of a crime nor
those whose conduct was "inevitably incident to" its commission are
liable as accomplices. 49
Most courts do not follow Hydrolevel, which applied the civil rule
under which an intent to benefit the employer is not needed if the
employee-agent acted with apparent authority."e This is an impor-
tant alternative when criminal acts are at issue because, as one court
noted, "[i]n cases involving intentional wrongdoing, the scope of
employment doctrine acquires something of an abstract quality, for
such wrongdoing is never really within the scope of an employee's
employment: if it were, then the employer's liability would be direct,
not vicarious."' The rationale for not applying apparent authority
seems to be that, as one court noted, using it "'against passive entities
that have been victimized by low-level employees' would not serve to
promote RICO's policy objectives aimed at eliminating the infiltration
N.A., 760 F. Supp. 369, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding that the "independent acts of an employee
not acting in his employer's interest are not a sufficient basis to hold the employer liable under
RICO").
'4 &4 eg., Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding no
liability absent participation and knowledge of employer), rev'don other grounds, 779 F.2d 885 (2d
Cir. 1985); Dakis Pension Fund v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 760 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (finding no
liability for employee conduct that injured employer).
' See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
" American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 565-66
(holding that "a principal is liable... though the agent acts solely to benefit himself, if the agent acts
with apparent authority") (citing Standard Sur. & Casualty Co. v. Plantsville Nat'l Bank, 158 F.2d
422 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 812 (1947)), reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1116 (1982). The
Court had earlier justified holding a principal liable even though no benefit was received by the
principal: "few doctrines ... are more firmly established or more in harmony with accepted notions
of social policy than that of the liability of the principal without fault of his own." Gleason v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 278 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1929). The distinction between respondeat
superior and apparent authority is that the former encompasses acts that the employer has specifically
authorized, as well as those that are within the scope of employment. Se4 eg., Harrison v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1425, 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1989); REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §§ 216, 219(1) (1957).
"' Harrison, 715 F. Supp. at 1430. As noted in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, liability
exists not because of the operation of the laws of agency but because of
the general rule, stated in the Restatement of Torts, that one causing and intending an act
or result is as responsible as if he had personally performed the act or produced the result.
If one intends a particular result to follow from his conduct and the result follows, it is
immaterial that the particular way in which it is accomplished was unintended.
RBSTATEmEN (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 212 cmt. a (1957) (citations omitted). For a general
discussion of the justifications for vicarious liability, see supra note 53.
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of legitimate businesses by organized crime."' 2 A few courts,
however, have applied apparent authority in civil RICO actions. 53
"I Metro Furniture Rental, Inc. v. Alessi, 770 F. Supp. 198, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting
Amendolare v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 162, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)).
Amendolare, however, actually stated that if apparent authority "is not employed against passive
entities that have been victimized by low-level employees ... the imposition of liability on an
organization for its negligence or acquiescence in allowing criminal activities would tend to promote
this policy objective." 747 F. Supp. at 171. But see Banque Worms v. Luis A. Duque Pena E H-ijos,
Ltda., 652 F. Supp. 770, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("When a corporation has been more a victim than a
perpetrator, it would be a distortion of both the language and intent of the statute to hold the
corporation vicariously responsible under RICO... merely because one of its employees may have
contributed to the scheme.").
One court held that apparent authority could not be used to impute liability to a municipal
corporation for the acts of its agents because this would not further the policies RICO was designed
to serve; it found that there are significant differences between private and municipal corporations
which required this result. See Gentry v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 911-12 (3d Cir.
1991). According to this court, an award of treble damages under RICO is a punitive sanction which
is improper because there are
at least two major distinctions between municipal corporations and ordinary corporations.
... First, there is the difference in accountability. Shareholders of an ordinary corporation
can require quarterly reports ... of the activities of their corporate officers or directors
... and thus have an opportunity to ascertain if there are any illegal or inappropriate
activities. ... Municipal officials, on the other hand, make no similar accounting to the
public ....
Second, a shareholder ... can promptly disassociate from the corporation by selling
the stock or bringing ... appropriate remedial action. ... [R]esidents of a municipality
have little opportunity, if any, for disassociation. . . . Without the level of accountability
and opportunity to disassociate ... the imposition of punitive damages against the
citizenry for the acts of municipal officials lacks the rational basis which traditionally has
justified such penalties against ordinary corporations.
Id. at 911-12. The court fortified its holding by recognizing that municipalities have traditionally been
immune from punitive damages. Id. at 910-11; accord Albanese v. City Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n,
710 F. Supp. 563, 567-69 (D.NJ. 1989).
"S See, eg., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 340 v. Sacramento Valley Chapter Nat'l
Elec. Constr. Ass'n, 1990 WL 118066, at *34 (F.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1990), reconsideration grwated,
No. S-86-0881-LKK/JFM, 1990 WL 264719 (Dec. 20, 1990).
[T]here appears to be little doubt that federal common law will impose vicarious liability
on a principal for the conduct of its agent within the agent's apparent authority, when that
conduct is tortious under a federal statute. The... question ... is the relationship of that
doctrine to the purposes of RICO.
The Supreme Court has explained that Congress' paramount goal in enacting the civil
provisions of RICO was to provide a remedy to those injured by the operation of business
enterprises through illegal means. ... The doctrine of vicarious liability, which operates
to widen the net of liability for violations of law, is not incompatible with the broad
remedial purpose of RICO to 'Tacilitate recovery by the victims of racketeering
activity."....
... Application of vicarious liability principles to bring within the scope of civil
RICO all those who operate the enterprise's affairs, either directly or through agents,
would appear entirely consistent with the underlying purpose of section 1962(c) ....
Given my determination that a principal will be liable for his agent's conduct within the
scope of the agent's apparent authority, if the jury resolves these factual disputes in the
plaintiff's favor, the corporate defendants may be held vicariously liable ....
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The above discussion outlines the issues that are implicated by any
attempt to impose vicarious liability in a civil RICO action."' While
the empirical permutations that arise are frequently more complex than
this discussion may indicate, it provides a context for considering
obstacles that confront RICO plaintiffs. The "person-enterprise" rule, for
example, can be a major barrier because subsection (c) is often the most
appealing premise for a civil RICO claim.ss It is the preferred option
because, unlike subsections (a) and (b), both of which require the
defendant(s) to have used racketeering activity or the collection of
unlawful debt to exert a relatively pronounced influence on the enterprise,
subsection (c) reaches a much lower level of impact"
As explained above, subsection (a) requires that the accused person(s)
use income derived from racketeering or the collection of unlawful debt
to acquire an interest in, establish or operate the enterprise; subsection (b)
requires that they use racketeering or the collection of unlawful debt to.
acquire or maintain an interest in or control of it.57 Subsection (c), on
the other hand, merely requires that such person(s) use racketeering or the
collection of unlawful debt to conduct or participate, "directly or
indirectly," in conducting the enterprise's affairs." A RICO plaintiff
can, therefore, allege a subsection (c) violation by showing, at a
Id. (citations and notes onitted). See also Harrison, 715 F. Supp. at 1431-32 (suggesting that if the
employee's actions had fallen within the definition of apparent authority then employer could have
been held liable for RICO violations); Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 811 (D. Md. 1985)
(finding that a corporation or partnership is liable 'Tor the acts of its agents andfor representatives
committed within the scope of their authority").
t For a more extensive treatment, see 3 BPrcKEY, supra note 30, §§ 14:01-08.
l See supra note 34.
"' See 3 BucKiEn, supra note 30, § 14:09(2), at 145 (1991 Supp.) ("As the statute only requires
that one participate directly or indire/y in the affairs of an enterprise, a RICO defendant need not
be shown to have participated in the management or operation of the enterprise.").
" See id. Henry A LaBrun, Note, Innocence by Association: Entities and tMe Person-Enterprise
Rule Under RICO, 63 NoTmn DAmE L. REV. 179, 203 n.173 (1988), has explained the effect of these
requirements:
If the racketeering activity produces a nonmonetary or untraceable benefit-or no benefit
at all-Section 1962(a) does not apply. Such activity ... is covered by Section 1962(c),
yet the person-enterprise rule effectively confers immunity upon entities when they violate
this section by conducting their own affairs through a pattern of racketeering. As a result,
plaintiffs injured by "non-profit" criminality are left without RICO'sremedies, and entities
engaged in such racketeering are left outside RICO'spurview. This result appears contrary
to both the statute's liberal construction clause, and its express provision for the
dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.
Id. Use of subsection (a) is further limited by a rule adopted by some courts that injury "must flow
specifically from the 'investment or use' of the proceeds of racketeering activity, rather than the
racketeering activity itself." Id. LaBrun warned that the effect of combining the person-enterprise
rule and the "investment rule'. . . may be to insulate entities from RICO liability altogether."Id. For
cases recognizing the "investment rule"see Gilbert v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 107,
109 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Heritage Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 629 F. Supp. 1412, 1417 (N.D. IlM. 1986).
" See LaBrun, supra note 157, at 203 n.173.
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minimum, that one or more RICO personi(s) used a pattern of racketeering
activity or the collection of unlawful debt to "participate indirectly" in the
conduct of the affairs of the enterprise."9
This is far less onerous than the requirements imposed under either
subsection (a) or (b). Thus subsection (c) may often be the only alternative
available to plaintiffs who have been victimized by conduct perpetrated by
individuals or entities who constitute a subset of the enterprise; it alone
reaches RICO violative conduct that is committed by those who exploit their
connections with an enterprise to this end, but who have acquired neither
control of nor an interest in the enterprise. This may explain why subsection
(c) is the most fiequently used provision in civil and criminal RICO
litigation.160
The problem with using subsection (c) is that the numerous courts that
enforce the "person-enterprise' rule will not allow a plaintiff either (a) to
allege that the enterprise is directly liable as a participant in the unlawful
activity constituting the RICO violation or (b) to impute that activity, as
carried on by its employee-agents, to the enterprise in order to hold the latter
vicariously liable for their conduct. 6 This means that a party who has been
victimized by the unlawful conduct of an enterpriset employees or agents
may be able to seek redress only against those individual employees or
agents, who are not likely to have resources comparable to those of the
enterprise. 2 The same result ensues as to any substantive RICO violation
when a court imposes the "scope of employment" requirement discussed
above.' 6' As the next part of this Article explains, one means of closing this
's See, eg., 3 BiucCE, supra note 30, § 14.09(2).
See supra note 34 and accompanying text. I
m See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
... For an example of a scenario such as this, see AD Hoc CVL RICO TAsK FoRcE, ABA Sec
OF CORPORAION, BANKING AND Busamss LAw 375-76 (1985).
[Sluppose the Board of Directors of a corporation commits multiple mail frauds in
its operation of the company. Surely each participating member of the Board faces
possible RICO liability. The only policy reason not to hold the company liable as well is
to protect corporate assets owned by innocent shareholders. But this interest may well be
outweighed by (1) the preference of allocating risk of loss to persons who have exercised
some choice in corporate governance or who can otherwise potentially exercise some
control over corporate affairs; (2) the desire to encourage private enforcement actions
when a legitimate enterprise is being turned to corruption; (3) the need to encourage
shareholders to insist upon internal audit procedures to protect against such corporate
activities; (4) the aim of ensur g full compensation of losses suffered by victims; (5) the
availability of actions on behalf of the corporation or shareholders against Board members;
and (6) the appropriateness of holding the corporate entity liable as a separate person just
as many of the advantages of "personhood" inure to its benefit. Accordingly, under
circumstances like these, the policies underlying RICO would appear to argue in favor of
an "enterprise" which is also a "person"pursuing its affairs through racketeering activities.
Id. See also United States v. Local 560, Int'lBhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 330 (D.NJ. 1984)
(observing that individuals may be charged under RICO as persons, and also grouped together as an
enterprise), affid, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cer. deded, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
"' See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
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apparent loophole is the application of the Pinkerton doctrine to hold
an enterprise and/or an offender's "principal" liable for any substan-
tive violation of subsection (c).
B. Pinkerton Liability
In considering how civil RICO plaintiffs can use Pinkerton to
avoid at least certain of the constraints noted above, it is useful to
note the efforts that have been made in this regard. The first portion
of this discussion, therefore, describes the reported cases that involve
attempts to employ Pinkerton in civil RICO cases. The second section
explains that it is permissible to use the Pinkerton doctrine in civil
litigation, and the last section describes how the doctrine can be
applied and the advantages that result from such applications.
1. Reported Uses
Very few reported cases involve attempts to use Pinkerton in civil
RICO cases.' Of those cases that have attempted to employ
Pinkerton in civil RICO cases, many have failed. In Feminist
Women's Health Center v. Roberts,65 the plaintiffs asserted RICO
conspiracy and substantive claims against anti-abortion protestors and
tried to use the Pinkerton doctrine to overcome one defendant's
motion to dismiss their subsection (c) claim against her.'" The court
held that tle plaintiffs had not alleged this defendant's involvement
in the conspiracy with the specificity required in federal civil
pleading; since their conspiracy claim was insufficient, they could not
use it as the premise for imposing Pinkerton liability.'67 The court
'"As to the reason for this, see infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
' No. C86-161Z, 1989 WL 56017 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 1989).
'"Id. at *4.
The evidence offered to support the charge ... concerns contacts that the Undseths
allegedly had with defendant Curtis Beseda after April 19, 1984, when Beseda set the
third fire at the Clinic, while Beseda was at large. Thus, relying on the Pie doctrine,
... the plaintiffs contend that the Undseths, as Beseda's co-conspiators, are vicariously
liable for the substantive offenses of the two arsons committed by Beseda after the
Undseths joined the alleged RICO conspiracy.
Id.
I' See id. at *6-7. FED. R. Cm. P. 9(b), which applies to civil RICO claims, requires that
"circumstances constituting fraud"be "stated with particularity." In RICO actions, the courts have
strictly applied FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). See Roberts, 1989 WL 56017, at *6; see also Rhoades v.
Powell, 644 F. Supp. 645, 670 n.20 (E.D. Cal. 1986) ('[A] RICO plaintiff should plead the facts
constituting the predicate offense with the particularity required by Rule 9(b)."). This is a common
problem in civilRICO pleading. See RAKon' & GoLSTIN, RICO: CiviL AND CRIMINAL LAw AND
STRATEGY § 7.0611] (1991) (Discovery requirements in RICO actions axe broad, given plaintiff's
burden of proving a pattern of behavior.).
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also expressed doubt as to whether Pinkerton could ever be used in this
fashion:
The plaintiffs submit that the Pinkerton doctrine ... applies to make
Bonnie Undseth and each conspirator vicariously liable for every
substantive offense of his or her co-conspirators. The Court concludes
that the Pinkerton doctrine does not permit the imposition of additional
allegations that Bonnie committed the substantive predicate offenses of
other defendants.. . . [Tihe plaintiffs here have not provided any case
in which the Pinkerton doctrine was applied ... to hold a RICO
defendant chargeable with a predicate offense of a co-conspirator ...
In fact, two courts have rejected similar arguments.'6
The two decisions the Robertson court cited as rejecting use of the
Pinkerton doctrine were United States v. Persico" and Laterza v.
American Broadcasting Co.70 Neither is to this effect. Persico, a
criminal case, held that one conspirator's commission of a predicate act
does not toll the RICO statute of limitations as to co-conspirators; it did
not address the general propriety of using Pinkerton in RICO actions,
civil or criminal."' Laterza was a civil RICO action for damages
allegedly resulting from a pattern of racketeering involving door-to-door
magazine subscription sales."7 The magazine publishers-defendants
moved to dismiss, claiming that the complaint failed to allege that they
had acted as principals in the commission of the requisite criminal
acts.1 The plaintiffs asserted that the publishers were liable because
they had contracted with the salesmen who allegedly committed the RICO
predicates; the plaintiffs apparently sought to use these contracts as the
basis for imposing Pinkerton liability on the defendants. 74 The attempt
failed because the court found that the existence of a contractual
relationship did not establish the requisite conspiracy. " The court,
however, did not address the legitimacy of using Pinkerton to hold a
defendant liable for the predicate offenses of a co-conspirator.
Another attempt failed in Frymire v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co.,76 a stockholder suit against an accounting firm for improperly
auditing corporate financial statements. The plaintiffs alleged a claim for
1 Robens, 1989 WL 56017, at *7.
.. 832 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
270 581 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
m See 832 F.2d at 714.
7 581 F. Supp. at 411-12.
'7 Id. at 412.
"I See Id. at 412.
. Id. at 413 (finding the "mere fact that defendants contracted together"insufficient to impose
RICO liability).
" 657 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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RICO conspiracy, apparently in hopes that the court would hold the defendant
liable for substantive violations committed by an alleged co-conspirator.t"
The plaintiffs failed because the court found that they had not adequately
alleged the defendant's involvement in the RICO conspiracy."
In some cases, however, the Pinkerton doctrine has been successfiuly
employed. The government used Pinkerton liability in a civil RICO action
against a union local,'79 alleging, inter alia, that the defendants had
conspired to violate subsections (b) and (c) and had committed substantive
violations.' The court found for the government on all the RICO counts
on the basis that, as members of a conspiracy, each defendant was liable for
substantive violations committed in furtherance of it, even though the offenses
were actually committed by other conspirators.' This is the only reported
instance in which Pinkerton was used to obtain a civil RICO judgment, but
two other decisions approve of this result. In Securities Investor Protection
Corp. v. Vigman," the Ninth Circuit clearly indicated that Pinkerton
liability could be used in a civil RICO action." A Wisconsin district court,
in dicta, reached the same conclusion.s
177 Id. at 895. The plaintiffs, however, "only [asserted] vicarious liability ... on a theory of
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), a conspiracy to violate RICO."Id. "Plaintiffs do not allege that
[defendant] violated RICO through its own acts. ... Thus any RICO liability could only be vicarious,
through an agreement to join a conspiracy which would violate RICO."Id. at 896.
.7. Id. at 895. Plaintiffs nmintained that the co-conspirator had violated subsections (a), (b) and
(c), but the court held that the complaint did not indicate "which of those sections [the defendant]
supposedly agreed to violate, let alone find facts which would support such an agrement." Id. Th
court dismissed the RICO count, but gave leave to amend. Id.
" United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamster 581 F. Supp. 279, 335 (D.N.J. 1984),
aft'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cer denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986). RICO creates a civil action
that can be brought by the government, in addition to the remedy created for private plaintiffs. &e
18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988).
1" 581 F. Supp. at 283. The government sought appointment of a receiver and injunctive relief
barring the defendants from "any further contacts with Iocal 560."Id.
"I Id. at 334-35. The court found that violations of subsections (b) and (c) "were established by
their own acts ... and, under Pinkerton, by the conduct of their co-conspirators." Id. at 335.
13 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'don other grounds sub non. Holmes v. Securities Investor
Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992). Although not deciding the validity of using Pinkrton
liability in civil RICO actions, the Supreme Court did state: "For purposes of this decision, we will
assume without deciding that the Court of Appeals correctly held that Holmes can be held responsible
for the acts of his co-conspirators." 112 S. Ct. at 1316 n.6.
10 908 F.2d at 1468-69. The court stated:.
If Holmes conspired with these codefendants, and if the codefendants caused the alleged
injuries, then Holmes is legally responsible. He need not have participated in every detail
of the conspiracy. ... Thus, if the district court properly concluded that there was a
genuine issue as to whether Holmes conspired to violate RICO, the district court erred in
granting Holmes' motion for summary judgment based on a conclusion that his conduct
alone did not proximately cause the injuries alleged.
Id. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circtit's finding of proximate causation. 112 S. Ct.
at 1316, 1318-19. Instead, the Court held that subsection (c)'s language, "[a]ny person injured ...
by reason of violation of [§ 1962]," requires a direct relation between the injury asserted and the
conduct alleged to find proximate causation. Id. at 1318-19.
114 Brunswick Corp. v. E.A. Doyle Mfg. Co., 770 F. Supp. 1351, 1371-72 (F.D. Wis. 1991). The
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2. Permissibility
It may seem peculiar that there have apparently been so few attempts
to combine Pinkerton and RICO's civil remedy, but this is largely the
product of an aspect of criminal RICO litigation. The Department of
Justice has chosen not to pursue Pinkerton liability in criminal cases
because "the combination of RICO and Pinkerton could lead to unwar-
ranted extensions of criminal liability.""lu Since civil RICO cases
require allegations that are functionally identical to those needed for
criminal charges, plaintiffs tend to model their pleadings on RICO
indictments; it is, therefore, not surprising that they have been unknow-
ingly influenced by the lack of Pinkerton liability in the available
criminal jurisprudence.'"
As is explained elsewhere, there is no doctrinal obstacle to using
Pinkerton in this context." It is used in other civil suits, and the
Department of Justice's self-imposed abstinence does not bind civil
litigants.s To understand why Pinkerton can be used to impute liability
court noted:
In light of the numerous letters exchanged between the defendants, once the jury accepted
that any particular defendant participated in the general scheme to defraud the plaintiff,
the defendants would have had a difficult time proving that any of the individual
defendants did not use the United States mail or interstate wire communication on two
occasions in furtherance of the scheme. Even if an individual defendant could have proven
he never used the mail or wire communications, a conspirator is responsible for offenses
committed by his fellow conspirators, ... and the jury unanimously found that each
defendant was a member of the conspiracy.
Id. (emphasis added). The court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the RICO claims
because it found that "there was insumfficient evidence to support the jury's verdict" on those issues.
Id. at 1356, 1374.
10 U.S. Dm'T OF JusricE, CRmLuAL DVISoN, RAcKETxR INFLUENCED AND CORRuvr
ORGANIZAonONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDmAL lNosncurons 73-74 (1985). But see Brenner,
supra note 100, at 986-1005 (arguing for the use of the Pikerton doctrine in criminal RICO actions);
see also United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 437 (7th Cir. 1991) (declaring that it is "not
wrong or improper"to use a Pinkeron instruction in a RICO case); United States v. Pungitore, 901
F.2d 1084, 1147 n.91 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding no "Pinkerton problem"with instructions in criminal
RICO case). See generally United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 504-05 n.7 (7th Cir.) ("This
is not to say that the use of Pin&dt instructions in RICO conspiracy cases is 'wrong or improper'
but only to caution that restraint be applied with regard to Pinkerlon in this context."), cerL denied,
479 U.S. 939, 940 (1986).
'" See generally Brenner, supra note 100, at 985-86, 1005 (discussing the judicial and
prosecutorial reluctance to apply the Pinherton doctrine in criminal RICO actions).
"' See Id. at 984-1009.
The Pinkerton doctrine has been used in a variety of civil actions. See, &g., Turner v. Upton
County, 915 F.2d 133, 137 (5th Cir. 1990) (civil rights case), cert dented, 111 S. Ct. 788 (1991);
Moses v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, No. 88-1864, 908 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1990) (unpublished
disposition, text in WESTLAW) (civil rights case); In re American Principals Holdings, Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. M.D.L. 653, 1987 WL 39746, at *9 n.10 (S.D. Cal. July 9, 1987) (securities violations).
Courts have held conspirators jointly and severally liable for damages resulting from the conspiracy.
United States Indus. v. Touche Ross, 854 F.2d 1223, 1251 (10th Cir. 1988); Kashi v. Gratsos, 790
F.2d 1050, 1055-56 (2d Cir. 1986); Beltz Travel Serv. v. International Air Trans. Ass'n, 620 F.2d
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to a RICO actor's "principal," it is necessary to review the nature of the
liability it imposes.
As was explained above, Pinkerton does not impose vicarious liability by
eliminating the need for a personal "bad act," but instead holds a conspirator
liable for the proximate consequences of the unlawful act of joining a
conspiracy." As such, it is conceptually analogous to the doctrine of
complicity, which was discussed in part I.B. of this Article."
Liability by complicity-more commonly known as "aiding and
abetting"-exists in federal law and is enforced in both criminal and civil
RICO cases."' The Third Circuit explained why the complicity doctrine
applies in civil RICO actions:
[O]ne important purpose ofRICO's civil provisions is to permit recovery by
the victims of racketeering activity. One who has aided and abetted the
1360, 1367 (9th Cir. 1980); Ferguson v. Omnimedia, Inc., 469 F.2d 194, 197-98 (1st Cir. 1972);
Durant Software v. Herman, 257 Cal. Rptr. 200, 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525
A.2d 146, 150 (Del. 1987); Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Tuckman, 372 A.2d 168,
170 (Del. 1976); Nicholson v. Kellin, 481 So. 2d 931, 935-36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Mercer v.
Woodard, 303 S.E.2d 475, 482 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Kramer v. Leineweber, 642 S.W.2d 364, 369
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Fox v. Wilson, 354 S.E.2d 737, 743 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
'"See supra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
"* See supra notes 71-93. The relationship between complicity and the Pinkerton doctrine has
been explained as follows:
Under Pinkerton, an agreement to commit a crime or crimes is a prerequisite for
liability.... The act of agreeing to the commission of certain crimes suffices; it is not
necessary that one commit any affirmative act to advance the realization of the goals of
the conspiracy. Complicity differs-in two respects: First, one can "aid and abet" the
commission of a crime without entering into an agreement to this effect. Second, to incur
aiding and abetting liability, it is not sufficient to associate oneself with a criminal
venture; it is also necessary to commit an affirmative act that is intended to advance the
commission of a substantive offense.
Pinkerton and accomplice liability are different means for holding a party liable for
substantive offenses that were executed by someone with whom that party shared an
affiliative relationship.
Brenner, supra note 100, at 969-70, 972 (footnotes omitted).
... On complicity in federal law, see supra notes 71-93 and accompanying text. See eg., United
States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1132 n.68 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding "beyond dispute that a RICO
conviction may rest upon the defendant's aiding and abetting of charged predicate offenses"), cert
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2009 (1991); accord United States v. Wyatt, 807 F.2d 1480, 1482-83 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 858 (1987); Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475,
485 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 283-84 (3d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986); United States v. Quaod, 777 F.2d 1105, 1117-18 (6th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); United States v. Schell, 775 F.2d 559, 569 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1339-41 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); Laterza v. American Broadcasting Co., 581 F. Supp. 408,
412 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1358 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd on
other grounds. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Judith L. Rosenthal,
Comment, Aiding and Abetting Liability for Civil Violations of RICO, 61 TEMP. L.Q. 1481, 1506-08
(1988).
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commission of two predicate offenses is guilty of those offenses ....
The doctrine of aiding and abetting is simply one way that an individual
can violate the substantive criminal laws.... So long as all of RICO's
other requirements are met, we can see no reason why victims should
not be able to recover from anyone who has committed the predicate
offenses -RICO enumerates, regardless of how he committed them."9
The rle of complicity most often applied in federal RICO cases is the
criminal doctrine codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2.193
There is also a civil version of the doctrine of complicity, which is
enunciated in section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Further-
more, at least one court has applied it to civil RICO actions." Under
section 876, one is liable for the torts committed by another if he:
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a
common design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious
result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach
of duty to the third person.'95
While the reference to liability for acting "in concert" suggests that the
Restatement incorporates Pinkerton liability, it actually does not." The
commentary to section 876 explains that even if parties have conspired
to accomplish a certain result, their "agreement is not enough for liability
'" Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349, 1357 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). In
discussing complicity under federal law, this court cited Pinkernm as one of "several well known
criminal law cases"that define accomplice liability in federal law. Id. at 1356.
"' 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475,
485-86 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 283-89
(3d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986); supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text; see
also Rosenthal, supra note 191, at 1483 (declaring 18 U.S.C. § 2 the starting point for determining
criminal culpability for aiding and abetting civil RICO violations).
'" Se, ag., Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1356-62. This court's use of the civil standard, however,
may have been an error
[Petro-Tech] marks the Third Circuit as the only jurisdiction to apply the civil aiding and
abetting standard to civil RICO violations. ... [Tihe Third Circuit erroneously believed
that it was joining the Fifth Circuit's position, as articulated in Anmco Industrial Credit
Corp. v. SLT Warehuse Corp., and the Southern District of New York court's position,
as articulated in Laterza v. American Broadcasting Co. In Armco and Laterza, however,
the respective courts applied the criminal aiding and abetting standard under section 2,
rather than the civil, Restateent standard.
Rosenthal, supra note 191, at 1500-01 (footnotes omitted).
... RESfATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977).
I" See id. § 876 cm. b.
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in itself, and there must be acts of a tortious character in carrying it into
execution.'1
97
Therefore, although liability for complicity can be imposed under a
civil as well as a criminal standard, the civil standard does not incorpo-
rate Pinkerton liability.198 This suggests that Pinkerton liability can only
be enforced in civil RICO actions, if at all, as a rule of criminal law. That
is an inadequate basis for objecting to its use because courts generally
agree that the criminal standard, not the Restatement formula, is used to
determine the scope of complicitous liability in such actions." Since
the criminal standard governs the use of complicity in civil RICO actions,
there is no reason why the closely related criminal doctrine of Pinkerton
liability cannot also be applied in these actions. ®
Indeed, employing Pinkerton as the standard for imputing liability to
RICO "principals" assures that such liability is based on the "bad act' of
conspiring to commit substantive RICO violations and not on the mere
existence of an agency relationship. This is a way of avoiding criticisms
that have been leveled at the practice of using civil doctrines to impute
liability in criminal cases."' It also promotes the policies RICO was
intended to further by predicating liability on conduct that the statute
specifically proscribes; in other words, when Pinkerton is used as the
criterion for imputing liability, it is limited to those who personally
committed a RICO violation." 2 This ensures that liability is imposed
107 Id.
'" The Restatement's rejection of Pinkerton is consistent with the American Law Institute's
rejection of Pinkerton liability in the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(6)
commentary at 143 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960) ("[L]iability for a substantive crime as an accomplice
cannot be predicated on the sole fact of having been party to a conspiracy to commit that
crime... ."); accord MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 commentary at 307-10 (Official Draft 1962).
'"See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
For a thoughtful discussion of the general applicability of both Pinkerton and complicitous
liability in civil suits, see Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 476-78 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
"0' See, eg., Samuel R. Miller, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Principle Fxtended to its Limits,
38 FED. B.1 49, 68 (1979) ("[Alpplying tort principles of respondeat superior in the criminal context
... undermine[s] the complex and difficult task of insuring corporate compliance with the law.");
Note, Criminal Liability of Corporations forActs of Their Agents, 60 HARV. L. REv. 283, 285 (1946)
('[S]hifting of the burden of loss to consumers, which is a principal justification of rem/ondeat
superior in the law of torts, has no application in the criminal law.") (footnote omitted); Simeon M.
Kriesberg, Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE U. 1091,
1096 (1976) ("[Tort analogy] overlooks the different policy considerations underlying criminal and
civil penalties"). According to Welling, supra note 57, at 1155 n.112:
Several commentators have noted that, when respondeat superior is applied in a criminal
context, one major anomaly has evolved. A principal who is a natural person is not
criminally liable for the acts the agent committed without the principal's authorization,
consent, or knowledge. In contrast, a principal who is a corporation is liable for the acts
of its agents regardless of its lack of authorization or knowledge.
Id.
" See, e-g., LaBrun, supra note 157, at 192 ("Insofar as treble damages exceed such real
damages, ... they also enhance available criminal sanctions which punish the wrongdoer and deter
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on perpetrators, rather than on "victims."2 3 Consequently, even
though it may be permissible to impute a broader liability by using
other civil rules, imposing Pinkerton liability in civil RICO actions
fulfills the goals of RICO while addressing the concerns generally
raised when civil doctrines of imputed liability are applied in criminal
cases.
3. Applying Pinkerton
The two most problematic issues for RICO plaintiffs are the
"person-enterprise" and "scope of employment" limitations.' This
section considers how Pinkerton can be used to avoid the problems
that arise under each.
As previously mentioned, under RICO conspiring to commit a
substantive RICO offense is a distinct RICO violation."5 Applying
Pinkerton to a subsection (d) conspiracy makes each conspirator liable
for: (1) the RICO conspiracy and (2) every substantive RICO offense
committed by any member of that conspiracy, as long as the substan-
tive offenses were a foreseeable consequence of the conspiratorial
agreement." In addition, each conspirator is liable for substantive
RICO offenses that she personally committed or participated in commit-
ting.?7
Given the complexity of RICO pleading, it is not practical to explore
every manner in which Pinkerton could be applied, but it is possible to
illustrate how Pinkerton can be used to avoid the restrictions imposed by the
"scope of employment" and "person-enterprise" rules. For example, consider
others. Because RICO's damage provisions contain a punitive or deterrent component, it seems
appropriate to require a showing of entity culpability.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 124-63.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988); supra notes 35-36, 40 and accompanying text. To reiterate,
the substantive RICO offenses are codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c).
' See supra note 111 and accompanying text. Pinkeri would also make each RICO
conspirator liable for the predicate offenses that are required for a substantive RICO violation. For
a discussion of predicate acts, see supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. While this can be an
important consideration in criminal RICO cases, it is not relevant in civil cases because generally
there is no private cause of action for the crimes that are RICO predicates. See, eg., Ryan v. Ohio
Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1179 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that them is no private cause of action
under federal mail fraud statute); Bell v. Health.Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding
that no private cause of action exists under either federal mail fraud statutes or federal lottery
statutes); Krupnick v. Union Nat'l Bank, 470 F. Supp. 1037 (W. D. Pa. 1979) (holding that there is
no private cause of action under federal mail fraud statute); see also Napper v. Anderson, 500 F.2d
634, 636 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding no private cause of action under federal wire fraud statute), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975).
' See supra notes 20, 32 and accompanying text. This includes both the liability of a principal,
who actually commits a RICO offense, and that of an accomplice who encourages or otherwise
assists one who commits such an offense. See supra notes 71-93, 164-206; infru notes 208-78.
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the following hypothetical: Assume that John Doe, the president of
Doe Chemical, invented ABC-666X, an additive used in gasoline
refining."' He assigned his rights to ABC-666X to Doe Chemical;
only he knows the formula for it. Doe Chemical maintained the
formula as a trade secret. It sold ABC-666X to refiners but required
that they execute a written agreement promising not to analyze it or
disclose anything they might learn in the course of using it. Calco Oil
Corporation bought ABC-666X pursuant to such an agreement.
StarChem is a chemical company that supplies refineries but does
not sell additives. Ted Smith, StarChem's marketing manager, decided
to copy ABC-666X. In February, 1989, he hired Sam Brown as a
chemist for StarChem's "XYZ Group," which developed new products.
Dan Black was Brown's supervisor. Smith, Black and Brown agreed
to develop and sell a version of ABC-666X. Smith asked Greg White,
a StarChem salesman who handled the Calco Oil Corporation account,
to get a sample of ABC-666X. On April 11, 1989, White, acting with
the knowledge and consent of his supervisor, Fred Grey, took a
sample of ABC-666X from a Calco refinery. Neither Calco nor Doe
Chemical knew this was done. White gave the sample to Grey, who
delivered it to Brown, who had it evaluated by StarChem's XYZ
Group. Mat Green, head of the XYZ Group, was aware that his group
was conducting the evaluation.
Using this evaluation, Brown developed an additive identical to
ABC-666X and used StarChem's attorneys to patent it. The patent
application went through the U.S. mail; the attorneys consulted with
Brown by telephone. The application stated that Brown was the first
and only inventor of the additive. After it was patented, Brown sold
all rights to it to DaxChem for $50,000, which he split with Black and
Smith; they left StarChem. DaxChem sold Brown's additive to two Doe
Chemical customers, Maxxon Oil Company and Calco Oil Corporation;
Doe Chemical lost sales of $300,000 to Maxxon and $500,000 to Calco.
Doe Chemical wants to use RICO to recover its losses. Assume that
the combined assets of Black, Brown and Smith are insufficient to
compensate Doe Chemical for its losses due to DaxChem's sales to
Maxxon and Calco, and that Doe Chemical can establish additional losses
of $1.1 million. Finally, assume that the conduct of Brown, Black and
Smith constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity, so that the only issues
to be resolved in assembling a RICO action on behalf of Doe Chemical
are: (1) defining the violations that were committed and (2) determining
who can be held liable for each violation.
These facts are adapted from the facts in RLE. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Nalco Chem. Co., 757
F. Supp. 1499 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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Obviously, given the limited assets of Black, Brown and Smith, Doe
Chemical would want to pursue an action against StarChem. The
following sections analyze Doe Chemical's ability to bring an action, first
by examining the extent to which the potential defendants-Black, Brown,
Smith and StarChem-can be held directly liable as the perpetrators of
RICO,2°9 and then by considering whether liability for RICO violations
committed by Black, Brown and Smith can be imputed to StarChem
under civil rules of vicarious liability ° The final section applies
Pinkerton liability to the hypothetical.2 "
a. Direct Liability
Violations: Each of the three substantive RICO offenses is considered
separately; a conspiracy to commit a substantive offense is considered in
the discussion of that offense."' Black, Brown and Smith are
collectively referred to as "BBS."
Section 1962(a): Section 1962(a) forbids using income derived from
a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest in, establish and/or
operate an enterprise; a conspiracy to violate subsection (a) requires an
agreement to this effect.2 3 BBS agreed to copy ABC-666X, patent their
formula and sell it to Doe Chemical's competitors; they used a pattern of
racketeering activity to carry out this agreement and realized income from
doing so.
The major problem in alleging a subsection (a) violation on these
facts is that Doe Chemical cannot show that its injuries resulted from the
acts of investing racketeering income in an enterprise, rather than from
the predicate acts of racketeering.1 4 To begin with the most obvious
scenario, if StarChem is construed as the enterprise, BBS's conduct did
not violate subsection (a) because they did not invest their racketeering
income in that entity. Absent an investment of racketeering proceeds in
the enterprise, there is no subsection (a) violation. Here, after realizing
the racketeering income, BBS terminated their association with StarChem.
Their agreement would constitute a RICO conspiracy if it targeted
conduct that violated subsection (a). However, BBS did not use their
See infria notes 212-37.
* See infra notes 212-37.
.., See infra notes 238-45.
t See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
1 See, eg., Fitzpatrick & O'Neill, supra note 42, at 29-30; see also 3 BRIcKEY, supra note 30,
§ 14.07 (noting that a plaintiff asserting a subsection (a) violation must prove receipt of racketeering
income and that the income was invested to acquire an interest in, establish or operate an enterprise).
But see Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 838-39 (4th Cir. 1990) (refusing to declare an
investment use limitation to actions arising under subsection (c)).
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racketeering income to acquire an interest in, maintain or operate
StarChem; in fact, they severed their ties with StarChem once they
received the racketeering income. It would of course be possible to argue
that their agreement contemplated an investment of the racketeering
monies in StarChem, but this argument does not seem to be warranted
based on the facts given above; absent such an indication, Doe Chemical
cannot base a civil RICO action on a subsection (a) violation in which
StarChem was the enterprise.
Alternatively, Doe Chemical could characterize Black, Brown and
Smith's relationship as an association-in-fact enterprise and argue that
their pattern of racketeering activity generated income that was used to
establish and/or operate this enterprise 1 Again, the problem is that once
they received the income, they ended their association. There is no indication
that the money realized from selling the copied additive was used to continue
the racketeering activity. Also, even if this were used as the basis for alleging
a subsection (a) violation, and a subsection (d) violation based on an
agreement to this end, it would not advance Doe Chemical' desire to
establish claims that will permit it to pursue StarChem "deep pockets."216
As yet another alternative, Doe Chemical could argue that the enterprise
was an association in fact comprised of Brown, Black, Smith and StarChem.
Although the facts permit the allegation of such an enterprise, they do not
sustain assertion of either a subsection (a) violation or an attendant subsection
(d) violation. As was noted above, when BBS realized the racketeering
income, they ended their association with each other and with StarChem.
The proceeds were not, therefore, invested in this enterprise, and there is
no indication StarChem ever had any access to this income. Finally, since
nothing suggests that an enterprise comprised of BBS and StarChem
operated after the individuals obtained payment for the counterfeit version
of ABC-666X, it is unrealistic to argue that the racketeering income was
used to establish and/or operate an association-in-fact enterprise consisting
of BBS and StarChem; even if this were established, such an enterprise
would have come into existence after Doe Chemical had already sustained
its injuries, and so could not be pursued as the cause of Doe Chemical's
injuries.
Section 1962(b): Section 1962(b) prohibits using a pattern of
racketeering activity to acquire or maintain an interest in, or control of,
215 An "association in fact"can be an enterprise even though it exists only for unlawful puposes.
See supra note 19.
Zl, For simplicity's sake, this discussion will assume that Doe Chemical does not wish to pursue
DaxChem. Also, it might be possible to allege that the BBS association-in-fact enterprise entered into
a RICO conspiracy with StarChem. The conspiracy allegation would be used to impose Pin on
liability on StarChern for substantive offenses committed by the BBS enterpis, since this achieves
the same result as alleging that there was a conspiracy between BBS and StarChem, it is not
considered as a distinct alternative.
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an enterprise; conspiracy to violate subsection (b) requires an agreement
to this effect.217 In order to allege a subsection (b) violation, Doe
Chemical must be able to show that the defendants used a pattern of
racketeering activity to have a proscribed impact on the enterprise 1
It will have difficulty doing this on the facts presented.
BBS clearly agreed to copy ABC-666X, patent their version and sell
it to a competitor, and they used a pattern of racketeering activity to carry
out this agreement. Their conduct will constitute a violation of subsection
(b) if it was used to acquire or maintain an interest in, or control of, an
enterprise. Likewise, their agreement will constitute a RICO conspiracy
if it contemplated such activity. There is, however, no violation of either
subsection if StarChem is determined to be the enterprise since BBS did
not use the racketeering activity to acquire or maintain an interest in or
control of the enterprise; indeed, nothing in the facts suggests that any of
them ever possessed any interest in StarChem.219 And since nothing in
the facts suggests that their agreement sought to obtain such an interest,
there is no basis for alleging a subsection (d) conspiracy to commit a
subsection (b) violation.
Again, Doe Chemical could characterize the BBS relationship as an
association-in-fact enterprise and assert that the three used the pattern of
racketeering activity to acquire and maintain their respective interests in,
and control of, that enterprise. From Doe Chemical's perspective, the
problem with this characterization is that if it were used to allege a
subsection (b) violation and a subsection (d) violation, such allegations
could only be made against the three individual perpetrators and their
meager assets; it would not permit Doe Chemical to pursue StarChem.
Doe Chemical could also allege an association-in-fact enterprise
comprised of BBS and StarChem, and claim that all four used the pattern
of racketeering activity to acquire and/or maintain their interests in and/or
control of that enterprise. The problem here is that it is difficult to cast
StarChem as a perpetrator. Though its personnel and facilities were used
in carrying out the pattern of racketeering activity, nothing indicates that
StarChem directed or exerted any control over that activity?0 Absent
some active involvement, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to show
that StarChem was a perpetrator of a subsection (b) violation predicated
on its association with BBS.
... See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
Sz, ee, eag., 3 BRICicEy, supra note 30, § 14.08.
2" For an example of a subsection (b) violation, see United States v. Jacobson, 691 F.2d 110 (2d
Cir. 1982).
This cooperation might establish StarChem's liability as an accomplice. See supra notes 82-86,
142 and accompanying text. But see Rosenthal, supra note 191, at 1505-06 (arguing that complicity
can only be used to impose liability for a subsection (a) offense).
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It might be possible to bring a subsection (d) claim, alleging that
StarChem agreed with BBS that those three would use a pattern of
racketeering activity to acquire control of, or maintain an interest in, an
enterprise consisting of: (1) a BBS association in fact or (2) a StarChem-
BBS association in fact. RICO conspiracy requires only that a conspirator
agree to the commission of a substantive RICO violation; no overt act is
required."2 Some courts require that a conspirator personally agree to
commit a substantive offense, but most merely require an agreement that
someone will commit such an offense.' As explained above, it is
difficult to allege that StarChem personally agreed to commit a subsection
(b) offense, but it might be possible, relying on the existence of either of
the enterprises noted above, to claim that StarChem agreed that BBS
would commit such an offense.
Of course, the main problem with civil conspiracy claims is showing
that a conspiracy caused injury; if Doe Chemical advanced such a claim,
StarChem would certainly move to dismiss on the premise that any
injuries Doe Chemical sustained resulted from the substantive violations
committed by BBS, and not from any agreement between StarChem and
BBS?2 A demonstrable injury resulting from a RICO violation is
regarded as a requisite for standing to bring suit under 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c).2
Section 1962(c): A section 1962(c) offense occurs when a "person"
who is employed by or associated with an enterprise uses a pattern of
racketeering activity to conduct or participate in conducting the affairs of
the enterprise; conspiracy to violate subsection (c) requires an agreement
to this effect.2 The necessary relationship between defendants and
enterprise exists however the latter is characterized. If StarChem is the
enterprise, then BBS were "employed by" it; StarChem's relationship with
itself is not pertinent because, as is explained later, it cannot be named
as a defendant if it is the enterprise? 6 If the enterprise is defined as an
22 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Another problem Doe Chemical might face,
assuming that it is able to show the existence of an agreement between BBS and StarChem, is
proving that the latter agreed to the commission of substantive RICO violations, and not merely to
the commission of the predicate acts involved in the pattern of racketeering activity. See, eg.,
Fitzpatrick & O'Neill, supra note 42, at 36 ("[P]roof of a conspiracy to commit the underlying
predicate acts of racketeering is [not] sufficient to prove a violation of subdivision (d). Rather, the
plaintiff must prove ... that the defendant agreed to invest in, control, or conduct the affairs of, an
enterprise by committing the predicate acts of racketeering.").
24 See BRICKEY, supra note 30, § 14:11.
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
"' See infra notes 238-45; see also Rosenthal, supra note 191, at 1504 n.194 ("Under subsection
(c), a person employed by or associated with Corporation X is liable if he conducts X's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity. Since X cannot be 'employed by or associated with' itself,
the 'person' liable under (c) must be an individual distinct from X").
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association in fact comprised of BBS and StarChem, it is clear that all
four were "associated with" that enterprise.
For the substantive violation, Doe Chemical must show that the
defendants used a pattern of racketeering activity to conduct or participate
in conducting the affairs of the enterprise; the requisite effect can be
either a direct or indirect result of the pattern of racketeering activity.m
As previously noted, subsection (c) is used more often than subsections
(a) or (b) because its requirements seem to be relatively less
demandingtm
If Doe Chemical used StarChem as the enterprise and named BBS as
the defendants, it could assert a subsection (c) violation by alleging that
BBS used the pattern of racketeering activity to participate indirectly in
conducting the affairs of StarChem. 2 Subsection (c) does not require
that the defendants' activities have had any profound impact on the
enterprise's affairs'm Indeed, this subsection is often used to reach the
conduct of one who exploited his relationship with the enterprise.3 1
Since BBS took advantage of their respective positions with StarChem to
enrich themselves, Doe Chemical will have no difficulty in alleging that
BBS committed a subsection (c) violation' And because the three
agreed among themselves to accomplish this end, Doe Chemical can also
establish that their conduct constituted a conspiracy under subsection (d).
These allegations suffice for a civil RICO action.
However, one problem remains if Doe Chemical wants to name
StarChem as a defendant. If it were to use StarChem as the enterprise, it
would have to allege that StarChem also used the pattern of racketeering
activity to conduct, or participate in conducting, its own affairs. While the
facts may support such an allegation, the "person-enterprise' rule would
bar Doe Chemical from asserting a subsection (c) claim against StarChem
because StarChem could not be both a RICO "person" and the "enter-
See, e-g., 3 BRicirY, supra note 30, § 14.09.
m See supra note 34 and accompanying text. But see Fitzpatrick & O'Neil, supra note 42, at
32 (stating that "subdivision [(c)] is at once the most complicated [and] the most commonly utilized
in both criminal and civil cases").
' Doe Chemical could also allege that BBS's conduct constituted a heightened degree of
involvement in StarCheri, such as "conducting" its affairs, either "directly or indirectly." Its ability
to make such an allegation would depend, of course, on the extent of the impact that BBS'sactivity
was shown to have exerted on StarChem.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 156, 158.60 and accompanying text.
2 See, eg., United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961
(1981). In Scotw, the Second Circuit declared:
[O]ne conducts the activities of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity
when (1) one is enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position
in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the enterprise, or (2) the
predicate offenses are related to the activities of that enterprise.
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prise." 3 Thus, if Doe Chemical uses StarChem as the enterprise, it can
allege a subsection (c) violation only against the individual defendants.
Since the "person-enterprise" rule applies to conspiracies to violate
subsection (c), Doe Chemical cannot allege that StarChem committed a
subsection (d) violationm Finally, since courts have held that plaintiffs
cannot use complicity to evade the "person-enterprise" rule, 5 Doe
Chemical cannot allege that StarChem "aided and abetted" a subsection
(c) offense in order to name StarChem as a defendant.
Doe Chemical may, however, attempt to avoid the "person-enterprise"
rule by claiming that the enterprise was an association in fact composed
of BBS and StarChem. Accordingly, Doe Chemical would allege that
BBS and StarChem used the pattern of racketeering activity to conduct
the affairs of this enterprise. Doe Chemical will argue that because this
enterprise is distinct from StarChem, it is permissible to name the latter
as a defendant in an action based on an alleged subsection (c) violation.
Yet, this argument will almost certainly fail because "courts have
foreclosed attempts to characterize the corporation as a 'person'
associating with an association-in-fact 'enterprise'comprised of itself and
its employees.""
" See Rosenthal, supra note 191, at 1503 ("Since section 1962(c) thrusts liability on the person,
a corporate enterprise cannot be held liable under this subsection. Thus, only employees who have
used their employer's facilities to engage in racketeering activities are liable under section
1962(c) .. "Xfootnote omitted). For a general discussion of the person-enterprise rule, see supra
notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
.. See. ag., LaBrn, supra note 157, at 195-96 ("Although some courts have permitted
allegations under section 1962(d) that a corporation conspired with its employees or agents, many
have dismissed such contentions as attempts to 'end-run' the person-enterprise rule.") (footnotes
omitted).
See, eg., Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349, 1359-60 (3d Cir. 1987); see also
Rosenthal, supra note 191, at 1505-06 (arguing that complicity can only be used to impose liability
for a subsection (a) offense).
' LaBrun, supra note 157, at 195. See, eg., Yellow Bus Lines v. Drivers Local 639, 839 F.2d
782, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1988), vacated sub nont Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Yellow Bus Lines, 492 U.S.
914 (1989), and adopted on reh'g, 913 F.2d 948 (1990) (en bane), and cet. dented, 111 S. Ct. 2839
(1991). In Yellow Bus Lines, the court held that reliance on an association-in-fact enterprise is
improper
where the relationship among the members of the enterprise association is the relationship
of parts to a whole. That is, while the corporate or organizational defendant may itself be
a member of the enterprise association, the members of the enterprise association may not
simply be subdivisions, agents, or members of the defendant organization.
Id.; accord Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 808 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 483
U.S. 1032 (1987); Robinson v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 674 F. Supp. 243, 247 (F.D. Mich. 1987);
American Bonded Warehouse Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 653 F. Supp. 861, 867
(N.D. Ill. 1987); Hanline v. Sinclair Global Brokerage Corp., 652 F. Supp. 1457, 1462 (W.D. Mo.
1987); Minnesota Odd Fellows Home Found. v. Engler & Budd Co., 630 F. Supp. 797, 800 (D.
Minn. 1986); Van Dora Co. v. Howington, 623 F. Supp. 1548, 1554 (N.D. Ohio 1985). But see
Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1361 (holding that it is appropriate to allow victims of the racketeering
activity to recover from corporation that is also part of the association-in-fact); accord Department
of Economic Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1463, 1482 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Rhoades
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Summary: Doe Chemical has several means by which it can seek to
hold BBS directly liable as the perpetrators of RICO violations; it cannot,
however, successfully proceed against StarChem in this fashion.2
b. Vicarious Liability
In order to hold StarChem vicariously liable for RICO offenses
committed by BBS, Doe Chemical will have to establish that BBS were
StarChem employees who were acting within the scope of their employ-
ment when they committed these offenses' The usual criterion for
determining if acts were within the scope of employment is to ascertain
if the acts were meant to benefit the employer.a9 Clearly, BBS's
conduct was not intended to benefit StarChem. It is apparent that BBS
exploited their employment to commit the racketeering activity and did
so for their own benefit This is evidenced by the fact that each
terminated his employment upon gaining the proceeds of that activity.
Indeed, the activity could not have been meant to benefit StarChem
because it did not sell additives such as ABC-666X; consequently,
StarChem could not have benefited either directly, by marketing the BBS
version of ABC-666X, or indirectly, by seeing a competitor's market
being undercut by sales of the ersatz ABC-666X' u
v. Powell, 644 F. Supp. 645, 671-72 (E.D. Cal. 1986), affidwihout opt'ion, 961 F.2d 217 (9th Cir.
1992); Nunes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1055, 1065 (D. Md.
1985).
' To summarize the results of the preceding hypothetical: Doe Chemical cannot allege that it
was the victim of a subsection (a) offense andlor a subsection (d) conspiracy based on subsection (a).
It can, however, claim that BBS committed a subsection (b) violation and a related subsection (d)
offense, but this does not allow it to seek redress from StarChem. Doe Chemical cannot proceed
against StarChem for such a violation regardless of whether the enterprise is characterized as
StarChem or as an association in fact composed of StarChem and BBS. Doe Chemical may also be
able to allege that StarChem conspired with BBS to commit a subsection (b) offense, but it will be
difficult to demonstrate that Doe was injured by the conspiracy. The facts would allow Doe Chemical
to allege that StarChem violated subsection (c) by participating in the conduct of its own affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity, but the "person-enterprise" rule would prevent recovery of
such claims. And because courts look askance at attempts to evade the "person-enterprise" rule,
alleging an association-in-fact enterprise composed of StarChem and BBS to bring a subsection (c)
claim would be equally fruitless.
See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
See Thrailkill v. Champion Ford, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1486, 1489 (D.N.M. 1991) (rejecting
claim that Ford Motor Company was liable under respondeat superior because employees of one of
its franchises engaged in racketeering that allowed them to sell more Ford automobiles); Harrison v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1425, 1430-31 (N.D. I1. 1989) (finding actions of
brokerage firm employees not within scope of employment when such actions were pursuant to a
"conscious plot to prevent Harrison from becoming a Dean witter customer, and to use Harrison's
funds for their own purposes").
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As previously noted, most courts do not apply the doctrine of
apparent authority in RICO actions.24 However, even if that doctrine
were applied to any of these facts, Doe Chemical would have difficulty
in showing that BBS's acts were within their apparent authority as
StarChem employees, if only because StarChem did not create, manufac-
ture or market additives such as ABC-666X. Since StarChem was not
involved with such products, it would not seem that BBS acted within
their apparent authority as StarChem agents in persuading Greg White to
obtain a sample of ABC-666X and bring it to Brown for analysis or in
convincing DaxChem to buy Brown's version of ABC-666X. 42
One could argue that Brown, at least, used his apparent authority to
have StarChem employees analyze the sample and to convince Star-
Chem's attorneys to help him patent his version of the additive" 3 The
objection to this argument is that liability is imposed under the doctrine
because an actor has taken advantage of an innocent party's erroneous
belief in his "apparent authority" to act on behalf of a principal.2 Doe
Chemical, however, was not directly victimized by any use which BBS
may have made of their apparent authority as StarChem employees; the
immediate objects of any misuse of this authority would have been other
StarChem employees and, perhaps, DaxChem. Since Doe Chemical was
not a direct victim of this activity, it is unlikely that a court would allow
Doe Chemical to invoke a doctrine that is generally regarded as
problematic in civil RICO litigation to hold StarChem liable for BBS's
actions, especially since Doe Chemical can pursue BBS directly under
RICO.
Also, even if a court were willing to hold that StarChem was liable
for BBS's conduct under any of these civil doctrines, the "person-
enterprise" rule would continue to bar Doe Chemical's pursuit of
"' See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
12 See generally Harrison, 715 F. Supp. at 1431-32 (holding that apparent authority does not
exist if party is on "notice that an employee is exceeding the scope of his authority").
" Apparent authority can mean that a party was victimized either because an employee
"purported to act or to speak on behalf of the" employer and the victim relied on this, or that the
employee "was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation." RESrATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2Xd). For a more extensive discussion of apparent authority
principles and their use in RICO actions, see supra notes 61, 150-53 and accompanying text.
', Liability is based upon the fact that the agent's position facilitates the consummation
of the fraud, in that from the point of view of the third person the transaction seems
regular on its face and the agent appears to be acting in the ordinary course of the
business confided to him
RESrATE EmT (SECOND) Ot' AGENCY § 261 cmt. a; see also id. § 265 (Unless a party relied on
apparent authority, "the principal is not liable ... for conduct of a servant or other agent merely
because it is within his apparent authority or apparent scope of employment."); American Soc'y of
Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 566-67 (1982) (citing RESrATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261 cmL. a approvingly).
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StarChem for a substantive violation of subsection (c) and/or a subsection
(d) conspiracy based on such a violation. 5 Since the facts do not
support the assertion of a subsection (a) violation, and make the assertion
of a subsection (b) violation highly problematic, it seems that Doe
Chemical would be unable to pursue StarChem by using conventional
doctrines of vicarious liability.
c. Pinkerton Liability
Doe Chemical can use the Pinkerton doctrine to hold StarChem liable
for RICO violations, including subsection (c) violations, if it can establish
that (1) StarChem conspired with, inter alia, BBS and (2) the violations
for which it seeks redress were a foreseeable consequence of that
conspiracy.' While Pinkerton is a rule of general application in federal
law, Doe Chemical will want to allege that this conspiracy arose under
subsection (d), rather than under another federal conspiracy statute 7
It will do this because subsection (d) is the provision that specifically
targets agreements to commit substantive RICO offenses, and because
RICO creates a private right of action for injuries resulting from
subsection (d)!'
To illustrate how Pinkerton can be used, assume that in its complaint
Doe Chemical alleges that BBS and StarChem were involved in a
subsection (d) conspiracy to commit a subsection (c) offense, that the
offense was committed, and that Doe sustained injury as a proximate
result thereof. Doe asserts that BBS used the pattern of racketeering
activity noted above to conduct and/or participate in conducting an
enterprise that was either StarChem or an association in fact comprised
of BBS and StarChem.! 9 Doe Chemical asserts civil RICO claims
against BBS as the direct perpetrators of the subsection (c) offense and
against BBS and StarChem as conspirators under subsection (d). Doe
Chemical would further allege that it sustained injury from this conspira-
cy by virtue of the fact that three of the conspirators perpetrated the
subsection (c) offense alleged. Rather than trying to show that StarChem
actually carried out this offense, it uses the Pinkerton doctrine to hold
StarChem liable for an offense that was physically perpetrated by
&4 .ee supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
u' See supra notes 94-119.
For a general discussion of Pbdkrton's application in federal law, see 3 BRicKEY, supra note
30, § 6:06; Brenner, supra note 100, at 944-78.
us See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
As to the association in fact, Doe Chemical may want to allege that it included parties and/or
entities in addition to BBS and StaxChem.
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StarChem's co-conspirators, BBS; by doing so, Doe establishes injuries
that proximately resulted from its subsection (d) claim.
In this example, Doe Chemical applies Pinkerton to a subsection (c)
violation; this offense was chosen for the example because it best fits the
facts given in the hypothetical and because it is the most frequently used
substantive offense. The general pleading structure given above holds,
however, regardless of whether a plaintiff alleges offenses under
subsections (a), (b), (c), multiple violations of any one provision and/or
multiple violations of any two or more.
Obviously, therefore, the Pinkerton doctrine provides a device that
can be used to attribute substantive criminality to any RICO "person"
who enters into a conspiracy to that effect. One advantage of this
application, noted above, is that it allows a plaintiff to allege that a RICO
conspiracy inflicted demonstrable injury.M Another, of course, is that
it provides a device that can be used to widen the net of RICO liability;
since a RICO conspiracy merely requires an agreement, a conspirator
need not have committed any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy
in order to incur liability for the conspiracy and for substantive offenses
that were its proximate result 2
This tactic also allows litigants to take advantage of the general rule
of criminal law that "'[o]nce the existence of a conspiracy is established,
even slight evidence connecting a defendant to the conspiracy may be
sufficient proof of his involvement in the scheme!""'ns Plaintiffs who
can prove that a RICO conspiracy existed and that it involved a
principal's agents may be able to use this rule to link the principal to that
unlawful activity, and thereby hold the principal liable for substantive
RICO offenses that resulted from the conspiracy.nt
' This, of course resolves the major difficulty that arises in attempts to base civil RICO claims
on alleged violations of subsection (d)--proving injury. See supm note 48.
' See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Certain areas of federal law enforce a rule under
which "a corporation is deemed capable of engaging in a conspiracy with its own officers, directors,
employees, and agents." John T. Prisbe, Comment, The Intracorporale Conspiracy Doctrine, 16 U.
BALT. L. RnV. 538, 538 (1987). This rule is not discussed, even though it would block the use of
Pinkerton liability in the scenario set forth above, because the majority of courts have held that it
does not apply to civil RICO actions. SeA ag., Lawaetz v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 653 F. Supp. 1278,
1287 (D. VI. 1987) ("The majority rule is that conspiracy can not lie against the corporal entity for
the concerted action of its employees who violate RICO on its behalf.'). Some courts, however, do
not apply the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine when a corporation acts through its wholly-owned
subsidiaries. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Amett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1281 (7th Cir. 1989).
"5 PERauNs & BoYcF, supra note 40, at 712 (quoting United States v. Schmaltz, 562 F.2d 558,
560 (8th Cir. 1977)); accord LAPAVE & ScoTr, supra note 69, at 529.
It is important to note that, according to most courts, Pinkerton can only be used to impute
liability for acts that occurred after one joined a conspiracy. See eg., BmicKEY, supra note 30, § 6:06
("Although overt acts committed before the defendant joined the conspiracy may be charged to him
for purposes of holding him liable for the conspiracy offense, the defendant cannot be held
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Pinkerton clearly provides an alternative means of holding a party
liable for subsections (a) and/or (b) offenses that it did not personally
commit. This alternative is likely to prove useful for litigants who
wish to impute liability for such offenses to a party whose account-
ability cannot be established under the conventional rules of vicarious
liability discussed earlier in this Article. 5 The more important
issue, however, is whether Pinkerton can be used to avoid the
limitations that the "person-enterprise" rule imposes on imputing
liability for subsection (c) offensesY' The example given at the
beginning of this section showed how Pinkerton can be used to
impute liability to a nonacting conspirator; the critical question then
becomes whether such use is inconsistent with the rationales behind
the "person-enterprise" rule. If Pinkerton is inconsistent with the basic
premises of that rule, it is likely to be disallowed as an "end run!"
around the rule;' but if there is no inconsistency, there should be
no objection to Pinkerton's use in this regard.
This discussion will assume that the "person-enterprise" rule is a
generally appropriate limitation on imputing what might be termed
"entity liability" for subsection (c) offenses.' Courts that enforce
the rule justify their action under either of two theories. One is that
the logical structure of subsection (c) does not permit the "person"
and "enterprise" to be the same entity. The other justification is that
it would be unjust to hold the enterprise liable because it is necessar-
ily the victim of a subsection (c) violation.'
retroactively liable for substantive offenses committed by others before he became a member of the
conspiracy."). The premise is that the civil doctrine of ratification should not be used to impose
criminal liability. See PmtxlNs & BoYcE, supra note 40, at 704-05 (declaring that ratification "is not
a criminal-law doctrine"); accord Levine v. United States, 383 U.S. 265, 266 (1966); United States
v. Knippenberg, 502 F.2d 1056, 1059 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Freeman, 498 F.2d 569, 575
(2d Cir. 1974). But see United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1002 (5th Cir.) ("When one
knowingly joins a conspiracy in progress he is responsible for acts of the conspiracy occurring before
or after his association with it."),cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979).
=' See supra notes 55-70 and 124-63.
25 As previously mentioned, the person-enterprise rule bars the imposition of liability for a
subsection (c) violation on an entity as a RICO person when that entity is also the enterprise. See
supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
' See eg., LaBrun, supra note 157, at 195-96.
"' The assumption noted above is made for analytical purposes only, and is not intended to
concede the validity of this rule. Though cases usually involve attempts to impute liability to a
corporation or other artificial entity, it may be possible to impute liability to an individual or sole
proprietorship. See eg., United States v. Benny, 786 F.2d 1410, 1415-16 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1017 (1986); McCullough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 142, 143-44 (7th Cir. 1985).
' See supra notes 124-63; see also G. Robert Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief under
Ci! RICO: Reflectios on Religious Technology Center v. Wollershein: Will C!vil RCO Be
Effective Only Against White-Collar Cime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 526, 581-84 n235 (1987)
(discussing, in considerable detail, the two justifications for courts' enforcement of the rule).
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i. Logical Structure
The rationale supporting the "person-enterprise" rule derives from the
language of subsection (c), which requires that the RICO offender must
be "employed by or associated with" the enterprise.2" Under the
"person-enterprise" rule, an entity that is alleged to have been the
enterprise cannot also be held liable as the perpetrator of a subsection (c)
offense, on the premise that the enterprise cannot be "employed by or
associated with" itself.26' And since the enterprise cannot be held
directly liable as a perpetrator, courts do not allow it to be held indirectly
liable under vicarious liability doctrines."
It is important to realize, at the outset of this discussion, that under
the Pinkerton doctrine a conspirator is not held liable as an actual
perpetrator of substantive offenses resulting from the conspiracy; the
premise for imposing liability is instead that these offenses are at least
partially attributable to the distinct "bad act" of agreeing to their
commission.63 As to subsection (c) violations, therefore, Pinkerton can
only be used to hold a party liable for offenses that were carried out by
other members of the conspiracy; given the context of this discussion, this
means that Pinkerton will be used, if at all, to impute liability to an
employer or other principal for crimes that were actually committed by
its agents-employees with whom it conspired to that end.
Under the "person-enterprise" rule, Pinkerton can be used to hold an
enterprise liable for subsection (c) offenses carried out by its agents-
employees only if doing so is consistent with the statute's requirement
that offenders be "employed by or associated with" the enterprise" In
analyzing this issue, it is necessary to consider two scenarios. In one,
liability is to be imputed to an entity that is the RICO enterprise. 65 In
the other, liability is to be imputed to an entity that is a component of an
association-in-fact enterprise that also includes the entity's agents-
employees among its members.2"
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
26 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
SSee, ag., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 33 (Ist Cir. 1986) (holding that
it is "inappropriate to use respondeat superior to occomplish indirectly what we have concluded the
statute directly denies").
See Brenner, supra note 100, at 944-78.
, See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
26 This corresponds to an attempt to hold StarChem liable for BBS' using a pattern of
racketeering activity to participate in conducting its affairs. See supra text accompanying notes 217-
24.
26 This corresponds to an attempt to hold StarCher liable for BBS' using a pattern of
racketeering activity to participate in conducting the affairs of an association-in-fact enterprise
composed of StarChem and BBS. See supra text accompanying notes 235-36.
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Since the first scenario directly implicates the "employed by or
associated with" issue, it is appropriate to begin with it. Assume,
therefore, that Doe Chemical wants to use Pinkerton to hold StarChem,
which is alleged to be the enterprise, liable for one or more subsection (c)
offenses carried out by BBS. Does allowing Doe Chemical to do this
violate the statutory requirement that RICO offenders have been
"employed by or associated with" the enterprise?
Such application of Pinkerton does not violate this requirement
because liability is not being imposed for StarChem's engaging in conduct
that is prohibited by the statute, but is instead being imputed to it on the
basis of a different, albeit related, wrongful act-agreeing to the commis-
sion of these offenses 67 As is explained elsewhere, imputing liability
for substantive offenses under Pinkerton merely holds a conspirator liable
for the foreseeable consequences of its criminal bargain 2 6s The act of
agreeing to the commission of offenses is considered to have an
independent causal significance that justifies holding one who agrees to
the conspiracy liable for its foreseeable results.269 Furthermore, an
agreement may be established by providing minimal evidence connecting
the enterprise to the conspiracy" Here, liability is imputed to
StarChem because, by agreeing that one or more subsection (c) offenses
would be committed, it became a contributing cause of any crimes that
were actually committed.27
It is for this reason that "a conspirator's inability to commit the object
offense as a principal does not" prevent it from being held liable for that
offense under the Pinkerton doctrine!' Therefore, even if one assumes
that the "person-enterprise" rule is valid, and that an enterprise such as
StarChem cannot perpetrate a subsection (c) offense by conducting or
" For the rationale justifying this imputation, see Brenner, supra note 100, at 944-78.
See id.
"See id.
See supra notes 253-54.
'7 See id. See generally United States v. Lebron, 704 F. Supp. 332, 333-34 (D.P.R. 1989)
(describing participation in a conspiracy as the act of causing the commission of an offense by
another).
' BRicKEY, supra note 30, § 6:06 ("Thus, for example, one who is not connected with a
financial institution may be guilty of conspiring to evade currency reporting requirements imposed
on the institution."); accord United States v. Donahue, 885 F.2d 45, 47-48 (3d Cir. 1989); United
States v. Segal, 852 F.2d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1988); Unites States v. Hayes, 827 F.2d 469, 472-73
(9th Cir. 1987); Lebron, 704 F. Supp. at 333-34. This aspect of Pinkeron liability reflects the general
rule that one can be liable as an accomplice andlor as a conspirator even if that party is immune from
liability for the offense under rules of substantive law. See, &g., BpacKEy, supra note 30, § 5:10;
accord United States v. Gornto, 792 F.2d 1028, 1035 (11th Cir. 1986); Wright v. United States, 243
F.2d 569, 570 (5th Cir. 1957), cert denie4d 355 U.S. 831 (1958); see also United States v. Tenorio-
Angel, 756 F.2d 1505, 1513 (11th Cir. 1985) ("A person may be guilty of conspiring to commit an
offense although incapable of actually committing that offense")(citing United States v. Rabinowich,
238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915)).
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participating in the conduct of its own affairs through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity, it can still be held liable under the Pinkerton doctrine for
conspiring with others to accomplish this result
The next issue is whether this result ensues under the second scenario
given above, in which the enterprise is an association in fact composed of an
entity and its employee-agents. The rationale courts give for refusing to
impose substantive subsection (c) liability under civil vicarious liability
doctrines in this situation is that plaintiffs are merely attempting to subvert the
"person-enterprise" rule by re-casting the enterprise But, as is explained
above, the rule does not preclude using Pinkerton to impute liability for
subsection (c) offenses to an entity that is itself the "enterprise." Since
Pinkerton can be used to impute liability when an entity is the enterprise,
there is no logical and/or policy reason why this cannot also be done when
an entity is alleged to have been but one component of an association-in-fact
enterprise, the members of which also included some of its employees-agents.
ii. Victim Rationale
The other rationale used to justify the "person-enterprise" rule is that it
would be unfair to hold an enterprise liable for a subsection (c) violation
because it is necessarily the victim of such a violation' Obviously, there
should be no need for this theory if the "logical structure" rationale is valid,
because under it, an enterprise cannot commit a subsection (c) violation 7S
This discussion, however, makes the rather problematic assumptions that the
"victim" rationale plays a role independent of the "logical structure" rationale,
and that it is empirically valid
Neither assumption defeats the conclusion reached above, which is that
the Pinkerton doctrine can be used to hold an enterprise liable for subsection
(c) violations committed by its employee-agents if the violations were a
foreseeable consequence of a conspiracy of which the enterprise was a
member.2 " The "victim" rationale in no way alters the validity of this
result because in this scenario the enterprise is not a passive victim but
has, in fact, agreed to the commission of the offenses in question. By
doing so, the enterprise has committed a criminal act that is considered
to have been at least a contributing cause of those offenses; 8 conse-
quently, it should be held liable for them.
See, eg., supra note 262 and accompanying text.
7 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 260-73.
' For critiques of this aspect of the "victim" rationalej see LaBrun, supra note 157, at 201
("Although the person-enterprise protects victims, it also protects perpetrators. As such the rule is
both dangerous and superfluous.").
See supra notes 94-119.
See supra notes 260-73.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that the Pinkerton doctrine, which
holds conspirators liable for substantive crimes committed by other
members of that conspiracy, can be used to allow civil RICO plaintiffs
to hold "deep pocket" parties liable for RICO violations that were
physically committed by their employees and/or agents. Because of the
constraints imposed by certain general principles of criminal liability and
by the intricate, often arbitrary rules of RICO liability, plaintiffs can
encounter difficulty in attempting to use civil vicarious liability rules or
the doctrine of criminal respondeat superior to hold principals, usually
corporate and other artificial entities, liable for the actions of those whom
they employ or for whose actions they should otherwise be held
accountable. Often, allowing these principles to prevent plaintiffs from
reaching such defendants undercuts the very policies that RICO was
intended to firther, i.e., sanctioning any use of an organization for
criminal purposes.
This Article proposes that in civil RICO litigation cases, courts should
incorporate Pinkerton liability as a rule of "civil complicity" in order to
allow plaintiffs to reach principals who have committed the independent
"bad act" of agreeing to the commission of substantive RICO offenses.
Although this act is itself a RICO violation, it is difficult for plaintiffs to
use it as a basis for obtaining redress for their injuries because a RICO
conspiracy, though itself an actionable violation, is an inchoate offense.
Such offenses were developed as a means of sanctioning conduct that
had not yet resulted in the commission of a crime. While conspiracy,
has come to be regarded as an offense in its own right, it targets an
intangible "harm," the act of agreeing that offenses will be committed.
Criminal law sanctions this act because it creates the "special danger" of
coordinated criminal activity? ' But because this act, taken in isolation,
usually does not produce demonstrable injuries to a "victim," it is
difficult to use it as the basis for recovery in a civil action.
The Pinkerton doctrine, however, recognizes that the act of agreeing
to the commission of offenses can cause others to commit them, and
I See supra note 276; see also G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action In Cowtext:
Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L REV. 237, 261-63 (1982) (noting that legislative
history exhibits an intent to broadly interpret RICO so as to provide remedies for victims of
organized crime).
' See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. I ON LEGI. 1, 3 (1989)
('"Inchoate' offenses allow punishment of an actor even though he has not consummated the crime
that is the oject of his efforts. Indeed, the main purpose of punishing inchoate crimes is to allow
the judicial system to intervene before an actor completes the object crime.").
" See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) commentary at 387 (Proposed Official Draft 1985);
Developmes in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L Rzv. 920, 923-25 (1959).
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therefore holds one who commits such an act liable for its proximate results.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts incorporates a version of this principle in
section 876, which allows one to be held liable for torts committed "in
concert ... or pursuant to a common design with" another.' This Article
contends that as to civil RICO litigation, this concept of "civil complicity"
should be expanded to include the Pinkerton doctrine, which imposes liability
for the proximate results of the prohibited act of agreeing to the commission
of substantive RICO offenses.
Implementing a doctrine of civil complicity that incorporates Pinkerton
liability will allow litigants to obtain redress from those who agree to the
commission of RICO offenses, as well as from those who actually perpetrate
them. This will have two results, both of which further the policies RICO was
intended to promote. One is that offenders, especially corporate entities, will
not be able to insuilate themselves from RICO liability by having agents
commit acts that they have sanctioned' The other desirable result is that
those who have been injured by RICO-violative conduct can seek redress
from all who contributed to its commission. This advances both the policies
of making victims of such activity whole and of ensuring that its beneficiaries
suffer for the consequences of their unlawful actions.
In addition to furthering these important policy objectives, recognizing
Pinkerton liability as a rule of civil complicity will also ensure that the
imputation of liability under the statute proceeds in a fashion that is consistent
with the traditional premises of the criminal law. That is, civil rules of
vicarious liability base a principal' liability for acts of its agents on the
existence of a demonstrable agency relationship between them. As noted
earlier, such rules effectively eliminate the requirement of a personal "bad
act."
While this result is satisfactory for civil liability, RICO is a criminal
statute; the civil remedy created by 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) is available for
injuries caused by criminal activity. It is, therefore, preferable to predicate the
imputation of liability for such activity on principles that are consistent with
those used to impose criminal liability. In criminal law, the personal
commission of a "bad act" is generally a prerequisite for liability. Since
Pinkerton bases the imputation of liability for substantive offenses on the
commission of a unique "bad act" rather than on the existence of a specific
relationship between parties, it is a preferable means of accomplishing this
result in the context of civil RICO liability.
RFATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977).
'3 See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 259, at 581-84 n.235; Ginger, supra note 126, at 471; James
C. Minnis, Comment, Clanfyng RICO's Conspiracy Provision: Persmonal Commitment Not Requred,
62 TuL. L. Rzv. 1399, 1417 (1988).
I" See generally Blakey, supra note 279, at 265-80 (providing a thorough analysis of RICO's
legislative history).
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